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Deal Protection Devices 
Albert H. Choi† 
In mergers and acquisitions transactions, a buyer and a seller will often agree 
to contractual mechanisms (deal protection devices) to deter third parties from 
jumping the deal and to compensate a disappointed buyer. With the help of auction 
theory, this Article analyzes various deal protection devices, while focusing on the 
two most commonly used mechanisms: match rights and target termination fees. A 
match right gives the buyer a right to “match” a third party’s offer so as to prevent 
the third party from snatching the target away, while a termination fee compensates 
the buyer when a third party acquires the target. Such mechanisms raise a number 
of important corporate and contract law questions. How effective are they in prevent-
ing third parties from competing for the target? Do they steer the target to be sold 
 to a buyer who values the target less? Are the devices harmful to the target share-
holders? To what extent can the negotiated deal price represent the target’s “fair 
value” when such devices reduce or eliminate the competition? This Article shows, 
foremost, that these devices can actually increase the target and buyer’s joint return 
and possibly the target’s stand-alone return. Match rights and termination fees func-
tion quite differently, however. While a large termination fee reduces the target’s 
stand-alone return and can lead to allocative inefficiency, an unlimited match right 
increases the target’s stand-alone return and promotes allocative efficiency. This  
Article argues that answering the corporate law questions ultimately turns on the 
question of how and why the target directors are utilizing the devices. If the devices 
are being deployed with the objective of maximizing the target shareholders’ return, 
not only can they be beneficial for the target shareholders, but their presence can 
also make the deal price a more reliable indicator of the target’s fair value. With an 
improper objective, not only do the devices undermine target shareholders’ return, 
but the court also should not use the deal price as evidence of fair value. This Article 
also analyzes stock and asset lockups and examines deal protection devices through 
the lens of contract law. 
 
 † Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I would like to thank work-
shop participants at the law schools of Columbia University, University of Michigan, and 
University of Southern California; conference participants at the 2018 Trans-Pacific Busi-
ness Law Conference and the 2020 Winter Deals Conference; and particularly Dhruv Ag-
garwal, Adam Badawi, Elisabeth de Fontenay, Joel Friedlander, Jeff Gordon, Michael 
Knoll, Vice Chancellor Travis Laster, Brian Quinn, and Bob Scott for many helpful com-
ments and suggestions. Comments are welcome to alchoi@umich.edu. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On April 12, 2018, two wholesale office supply companies, 
Genuine Parts Corporation (GPC) and Essendant, Inc., agreed to 
combine their office supply businesses in order to better compete 
against e-commerce sellers, such as Amazon.com, Inc.1 The agree-
ment contained several deal protection measures for GPC.2 The 
 
 1 See Genuine Parts Co. v. Essendant, Inc., No. 2018-0730-JRS, 2019 WL 4257160, 
at *1 (Del. Ch. 2019); In re Essendant, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 2018-0789-JRS, 2019 WL 
7290944, at *2 (Del. Ch. 2019). 
 2 See Essendant Inc., Agreement and Plan of Merger, Dated as of April 12, 2018, by 
and Among Genuine Parts Company, Rhino SpinCo, Inc., Essendant Inc. and Elephant 
Merger Sub Corp. 53–56, 79, A-12 (Form 10-Q, Exhibit 10.5) (Apr. 25, 2018) [hereinafter 
GPC-Essendant Merger Agreement]. 
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first was a nonsolicitation (“no-shop”) provision that prohibited 
Essendant from directly soliciting a third-party offer but that 
nonetheless allowed Essendant to negotiate with a third party in 
case an unsolicited, superior offer3 were made (a “fiduciary out”).4 
The second was a match right: in the case that a third party made 
an unsolicited superior offer, Essendant was obligated to negoti-
ate in “good faith” for three days with GPC so as to give GPC an 
opportunity to beat the third party’s offer.5 The match right was 
unlimited: whenever a third party revised its offer or another 
party made an offer, a new three-day period would start.6 The 
third was a termination fee, which required Essendant to pay 
$12 million to GPC in the case that Essendant decided to merge 
with a third party.7 
The merger was structured in such a way that the shareholders 
of GPC were to receive Essendant stock in return for their own-
ership interest in GPC’s office supply business.8 Because Es-
sendant had to issue a large amount of stock, Essendant had to 
schedule a special meeting of its shareholders to receive their ap-
proval.9 Before Essendant was able to get the approval, however, 
a private equity firm, Sycamore (which owned Staples, another 
 
 3 The agreement defined “Superior Proposal” as 
a written bona fide offer or proposal made by a third party . . . on terms and 
conditions that the [Essendant board] determines, in its good faith judgment, 
after consulting with a financial advisor of internationally recognized reputation 
and external legal counsel, and taking into account all legal, financial and regu-
latory and other aspects of the proposal, including availability of financing, and 
any changes to the terms of this Agreement proposed by GPC in response to such 
offer or proposal, or otherwise, to be (a) more favorable from a financial point of 
view, to the stockholders of [Essendant] than the Merger and (b) reasonably ex-
pected to be consummated. 
Id. at A-12 to -13. 
 4 See id. § 7.03(a), at 53 (nonsolicitation provision); id. § 7.03(c), at 54 (fiduciary out). 
 5 See id. § 7.03(d), at 54–56. 
 6 See id. § 7.03(d)(ii)(2), at 56. 
 7 See GPC-Essendant Merger Agreement, supra note 2, § 9.03(a)(ii), at 79; id. at A-13. 
 8 The transaction was structured as a “spin merger”—specifically, a Reverse Morris 
Trust transaction, see Young Ran Kim & Geeyoung Min, Insulation by Separation: When 
Dual-Class Stock Met Corporate Spin-offs, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1, 11 (2019)—in which 
GPC was to spin off its wholly owned subsidiary, S.P. Richards Co. (SPR), in the first step 
and, in the second step, Essendant’s wholly owned subsidiary was to merge with SPR. In 
order to receive the necessary tax benefits, the shareholders of GPC had to own more than 
50% of the combined entity. See GPC-Essendant Merger Agreement, supra note 2, Recit-
als, at 1; id. art. II, at 2–5; see also Essendant Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Apr. 12, 2018). 
 9 See GPC-Essendant Merger Agreement, supra note 2, § 7.02, at 53. Under New 
York Stock Exchange regulations, when a company issues more than 20% of its outstand-
ing stock as part of a merger or an acquisition, the company has to receive its shareholders’ 
approval. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 312.03 (2019). 
760 The University of Chicago Law Review [88:757 
 
office supply company), made a competing offer on April 29, 2018, 
of $11.50 per share for all of Essendant’s outstanding stock.10 De-
ciding that this offer was likely to be superior to the merger with 
GPC, Essendant notified GPC, thereby triggering GPC’s three-
day match right. While protesting that the offer from Sycamore 
was not “[s]uperior,”11 GPC nonetheless decided to “match” the of-
fer by increasing its consideration by about $4 per share.12 When 
Sycamore came back with a sweetened offer, thereby triggering 
another three-day match period, however, GPC declined to 
match.13 On September 10, 2018, after some further negotiations, 
Essendant accepted Sycamore’s final bid of $12.80, and upon the 
termination of the agreement with GPC, GPC collected the 
$12 million termination fee.14 
While deal protection measures—such as no-shop clauses, 
match rights, and termination fees, as seen in the GPC-Essendant 
story—have been fairly common in mergers-and-acquisitions 
 
 10 See Genuine Parts, 2019 WL 4257160, at *4. While I am trying to use the GPC-
Essendant transaction as a motivating example, the actual story is a bit more complex. In 
fact, Sycamore made an all-cash offer of $11.50 per share on April 17, 2018, and Es-
sendant’s board initially determined that this earlier offer was not likely to lead to a su-
perior proposal. On April 29, 2018, Sycamore made a “renewed” proposal at the same cash 
amount of $11.50, but it also indicated that it might make a higher bid upon receiving 
Essendant’s nonpublic information. This time, however, Essendant’s board concluded that 
Sycamore’s new offer was reasonably likely to lead to a superior offer and notified GPC in 
accordance, thereby triggering the first three-day match period. Id. 
 11 Id. While the cash offer from Sycamore was easy to value, valuing the considera-
tion from SPR, GPC’s wholly owned subsidiary, was not as straightforward. Using a dis-
counted cash flow analysis, GPC argued that the consideration offered by Sycamore was 
significantly lower than the share price implied from the GPC-Essendant merger. Id. 
 12 Id. The $4 increase was not in the form of cash but was in the form of a “contingent 
value right” that Essendant shareholders would be able to receive once stipulated contin-
gencies had been satisfied. Id. Note here that after GPC matched Sycamore’s offer, Es-
sendant did not have an obligation to accept GPC’s matching offer. Essendant was free to 
propose GPC’s matching offer to Sycamore in the hopes of inducing Sycamore to sweeten 
its proposal. This is an important difference from the conventional right of first refusal. 
For a more detailed analysis and comparison, see infra Part III.B.1. 
 13 See In re Essendant, 2019 WL 7290944, at *4. 
 14 Id. Notwithstanding its acceptance of the $12 million termination fee, GPC has 
brought suit against Essendant arguing, among other things, that Essendant breached its 
contractual obligations, especially the nonsolicitation (no-shop) provisions. Genuine Parts, 
2019 WL 4257160, at *9. Because the argument is based on a breach of the nonsolicitation 
provision, GPC argued that it is entitled to full expectation damages. According to the 
GPC-Essendant Merger Agreement, “in the event that the Termination Fee is paid in ac-
cordance with [ ] Section 9.03, the payment of the Termination Fee shall be the sole and 
exclusive remedy of GPC.” GPC-Essendant Merger Agreement, supra note 2, § 9.03(e), at 
81. On September 9, 2019, the Delaware Court of Chancery denied Essendant’s motion to 
dismiss. See Genuine Parts, 2019 WL 4257160, at *11. 
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transactions for quite some time,15 the law’s treatment of them 
has gone through some significant changes. Judicial attitudes  
toward deal protection devices can roughly be divided into three 
periods: initial hostility during the active takeover period of  
the late 1980s and early 1990s, followed by a more permissive 
stance, and finally, the recent, renewed examination stemming 
from appraisal cases.16 Initially, courts were quite unfavorable  
to deal protection devices, as seen in the seminal cases, such  
as Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,17 and  
Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.18 The 
courts were concerned about whether agreeing to certain deal  
protection devices would constitute a breach of the target direc-
tors’ fiduciary duties and also undermine the target shareholders’ 
return. In subsequent cases, however, such as In re Toys “R” Us, 
 
 15 The story of Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group, Inc. (a car rental company), is also 
quite instructive. On April 25, 2010, Dollar Thrifty and Hertz Global Holdings, Inc., en-
tered into an agreement, pursuant to which Dollar Thrifty shareholders were entitled to 
receive $41 per share (80% cash and 20% Hertz stock). See In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder 
Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 592 (Del. Ch. 2010). The agreement contained, among other things, a 
match right for Hertz. Id. at 593. A few days later, however, Avis Budget Group, Inc., 
made a competing offer of $46.50 per share (part cash and part stock). Id. at 594. Although 
the size of the consideration seemed more attractive than the offer from Hertz, Dollar 
Thrifty’s board determined that Avis’s offer did not constitute a “Superior Proposal” due, 
in large part, to the concern over whether they will be able to get the necessary antitrust 
approval on a timely basis and the fact that Avis did not offer any reverse termination fee. 
Id. More recently, 21st Century Fox, Inc., declined to entertain an offer from Comcast 
Corp. due to antitrust and lack of reverse termination fee concerns, even though Comcast’s 
offer was higher than that of Walt Disney Co. See Shalini Ramachandran & Ben Fritz, 
Fox Rejected Higher Comcast Bid Due to Antitrust Concerns, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 19, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/JHH8-8GZH; see also Afra Afsharipour, Transforming the Allocation of 
Deal Risk Through Reverse Termination Fees, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1206–18 (2010) (ex-
amining the risk allocation role played by reverse termination fees); Albert Choi & George 
Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 
YALE L.J. 848, 872–76, 922 (2010) (examining the role played by liquidated damages, such 
as reverse termination fees, in mergers and acquisitions transactions); Brian J.M. Quinn, 
Optionality in Merger Agreements, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 789, 809–13, 824–27 (2010) (empir-
ically comparing reverse termination fees with target termination fees and arguing that 
symmetric termination fees may be inefficient); Albert H. Choi & Abraham Wickelgren, 
Reverse Breakup Fees and Antitrust Approval 8–15 (May 25, 2020) (unpublished manu-
script) (analyzing the role played by reverse breakup fees in securing antitrust approval). 
The shareholders of Dollar Thrifty later rejected the agreement with Hertz and the deal 
fell apart. A few years later, Dollar Thrifty and Hertz managed to successfully complete 
the new deal at a consideration of $87.50 for each Dollar Thrifty share. See Michael J. de 
la Merced & Peter Lattman, After Long Pursuit, Hertz to Buy Dollar Thrifty for $2.3 Bil-
lion, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2012), https://perma.cc/RUD9-T57H. 
 16 See infra Part I for a more detailed review of the historical development over deal 
protection devices. 
 17 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 18 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). 
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Inc. Stockholder Litigation,19 Ryan v. Lyondell Chemical Co.20 
(Lyondell I), and C & J Energy Services v. City of Miami General 
Employees’ & Sanitation Employees’ Retirement Trust,21 the 
courts took a much more permissive stance toward deal protection 
devices. 
Although the question whether agreeing to certain deal pro-
tection devices can constitute a breach of fiduciary duty has not 
been fully resolved,22 the recent controversy over appraisal has 
breathed new life into the subject. In an appraisal litigation, target 
shareholders, who are dissenting to the merger, ask the court to 
determine the “fair value” of the shares.23 One prominent issue 
was whether the court could use the deal price itself as an indica-
tor of fair value.24 In cases such as DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield 
Value Partners,25 Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Mas-
ter Fund,26 and Verition Partners Master Fund v. Aruba Net-
works,27 the Delaware Supreme Court stated that when an acqui-
sition is done at “arms’ length” and when there is sufficient 
competition for the target, either before or after the agreement 
has been signed, the deal price is a reliable indicator of the fair 
value of the target’s shares.28 In determining whether a 
 
 19 877 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
 20 No. 3176–VCN, 2008 WL 2923427 (Del. Ch. 2008); see also Lyondell Chem. Co. v. 
Ryan (Lyondell II), 970 A.2d 235, 243–44 (Del. 2009). 
 21 107 A.3d 1049, 1069–70 (Del. 2014). 
 22 Notwithstanding the general permissiveness toward deal protection devices in fi-
duciary duty cases, by no means is the debate over. Plaintiffs are still raising, and Dela-
ware courts are still grappling with, the issue of whether entering into certain deal pro-
tection devices can constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. Skepticism against deal 
protection devices gets especially heightened when there are other indicia that the target 
directors may have breached their fiduciary duty. See, e.g., In re PLX Tech. Inc. S’holders 
Litig., No. 9880-VCL, 2018 WL 5018535, at *44 (Del. Ch. 2018) (stating that when there 
are “undisclosed conflicts of interest” among the directors, match rights and a 3.5% termi-
nation fee that are “otherwise reasonable” can trigger judicial skepticism); see also In re 
MeadWestvaco S’holders Litig., 168 A.3d 675, 686–87 (Del. Ch. 2017); van der Fluit v. 
Yates, No. 12553-VCMR, 2017 WL 5953514, at *10–11 (Del. Ch. 2017). 
 23 The controversy over appraisal stemmed, in large part, from the emergence of “ap-
praisal arbitrage,” where institutional investors, such as hedge funds, would purchase the 
target’s shares, sometimes even after the merger has been announced, primarily for the 
purpose of exercising the appraisal remedy. For background information, see Albert H. 
Choi & Eric Talley, Appraising the “Merger Price” Appraisal Rule, 34 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
543, 543–44 (2018). 
 24 Id. 
 25 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017). 
 26 177 A.3d 1 (Del. 2017). 
 27 210 A.3d 128 (Del. 2019). 
 28 DFC Global, 172 A.3d at 366 (noting that “the sale value resulting from a robust 
market check will often be the most reliable evidence of fair value,” but declining to create 
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transaction satisfies such a standard, the presence or the absence 
of deal protection devices, not surprisingly, became a salient is-
sue. For instance, in In re AOL Inc.,29 the Delaware Court of 
Chancery declined to use the deal price to determine the fair 
value when, among other things, the deal was subject to buyer-
friendly deal protection measures, including an unlimited match 
right.30 
The line of cases from Revlon and Paramount v. QVC, 
through In re Toys “R” Us and C & J Energy Services, and into 
the recent appraisal cases such as In re AOL, raises interesting 
and important questions about deal protection devices. When the 
transacting parties (such as GPC and Essendant) are trying to 
“lock up” the deal, to what extent are deal protection measures 
successful in ensuring that a competing buyer (such as Sycamore) 
will not try to “jump” the deal? How do they affect a third party’s 
(Sycamore’s) incentive to compete? For instance, if the buyer 
(GPC) has an unlimited match right, given that the buyer can 
match a third party’s offer as many times as it desires, can this 
substantially deter a third party (such as Sycamore) from com-
peting against the buyer (GPC)?31 What if the target has an 
 
a jurisprudential presumption to that effect); see also Dell, 177 A.3d at 35 (explaining that 
the deal price should be given “heavy weight” when there is “evidence of market efficiency, 
fair play, low barriers to entry, [and] outreach to all logical buyers”); Verition Partners, 
210 A.3d at 138 (explaining that a deal price that is “informed by the efforts of arm’s length 
buyers of the entire company” is “likely to be indicative of so-called fundamental value”). 
 29 No. 11204–VCG, 2018 WL 1037450 (Del. Ch. 2018). 
 30 Id. at *9 (finding that a deal price could not be used as a measure of fair value 
because potential competing bidders would have been deterred by the no-shop provision 
and “unlimited three-day matching rights,” evidence that the CEO had already committed 
to the buyer, and informational disadvantages). 
 31 Professors Brian Quinn and Guhan Subramanian have argued, for instance, that 
an unlimited match right can substantially exacerbate what’s known as the “winner’s 
curse problem” and deter a competing buyer from emerging. See Fernán Restrepo & Gu-
han Subramanian, The New Look of Deal Protection, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1013, 1058–59 
(2017) (“The match right [ ] fuels the classic ‘winner’s curse’ problem: in any scenario 
where a third party bids and wins, it would know that a better-informed party (namely, 
the first bidder) thought that the price was too high. Looking forward and reasoning back, 
a third party is unlikely to bid.”); Brian J.M. Quinn, Re-Evaluating the Emerging Stand-
ard of Review for Matching Rights in Control Transactions, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1011, 1027 
(2011) (stating that when there is a match right, “the second bidder risks falling victim to 
the winner’s curse problem”). More recently, in a series of articles, Professor Subramanian 
argues that “an exclusive pre-signing negotiation followed by a go-shop process in which 
the buyer gets an unlimited match right would probably not qualify for deference to the 
deal price.” Guhan Subramanian, Appraisal After Dell, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN 
CHANGING TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING UP? 222, 226 (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall 
Stuart Thomas eds., 2019); accord Guhan Subramanian & Annie Zhao, Go-Shops Revis-
ited, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1215, 1275 (2020). This Article argues that a competition between 
764 The University of Chicago Law Review [88:757 
 
obligation to pay a large termination fee? From the target share-
holders’ perspective, do the deal protection devices undercut their 
return?32 Finally, in the context of an appraisal remedy, does the 
presence of deal protection devices undermine the reliability of 
the deal price as an indicator of fair value? Should the presence 
of an unlimited match right, for instance, make the deal price un-
reliable evidence?33 What factors do we need to consider in an-
swering these questions? 
This Article analyzes deal protection devices,34 focusing, in 
particular, on match rights and termination fees, with the help of 
 
multiple buyers when the inside buyer has a match right should be thought of as replicat-
ing an English auction, and in that setting, the winner’s curse problem is unlikely to arise. 
And this will be true even when the inside bidder has an informational advantage vis-à-
vis outside bidders. For a more general discussion of the winner’s curse problem in auc-
tions, see infra Part III.D. 
 32 Some practitioners and jurists have argued that deal protection measures are nec-
essary to entice the initial buyer to undertake costly due diligence and to make a bid, 
working as a compensation mechanism. By inducing the initial buyer to make a proposal, 
the devices can increase target shareholders’ value. See Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp., 695 A.2d 
43, 45 (Del. 1997); In re Toys “R” Us, 877 A.2d at 1017; see also Marcel Kahan & Michael 
Klausner, Lockups and the Market for Corporate Control, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1539, 1546–47 
(1996) (arguing that lockups can incentivize a potential buyer to participate in a bidding 
competition); Yeon-Koo Che & Tracy R. Lewis, The Role of Lockups in Takeover Contests, 
38 RAND J. ECON. 648, 660–62 (2007) (analytically examining the circumstances under 
which lockups can facilitate the emergence of a bidder); Restrepo & Subramanian, supra 
note 31, at 1018. Although this may be true, unless a lost opportunity cost (which is pre-
sumed to be difficult to estimate) is quite high, a better mechanism in dealing with this 
may be through an expense reimbursement provision (or some measure of reliance damages). 
By generously compensating the disappointed buyer with various expenses (including fi-
nancial and legal advisor fees), expense reimbursement can function relatively well to 
compensate the buyer. Also, such a rationale seems to be weak with respect to a match 
right, especially when a termination fee provision is present. 
 33 See, e.g., Subramanian, supra note 31, at 226 (stating that “an exclusive pre-sign-
ing negotiation followed by a go-shop process in which the buyer gets an unlimited match 
right would probably not qualify for deference to the deal price”). 
 34 About thirty years ago, Professor Ian Ayres started a heated debate on deal pro-
tection devices with his provocative thesis that moderately sized stock lockups generate 
no allocative inefficiency. See Ian Ayres, Analyzing Stock Lock-Ups: Do Target Treasury Sales 
Foreclose or Facilitate Takeover Auctions?, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 682, 696–97 (1990). Numer-
ous scholars have since then analytically and empirically examined the impact of various 
deal protection devices. See, e.g., Stephen Fraidin & Jon D. Hanson, Toward Unlocking 
Lockups, 103 YALE L.J. 1739, 1803–04 (1994); David A. Skeel, Jr., A Reliance Damages 
Approach to Corporate Lockups, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 564, 572–80 (1996); Kahan & Klausner, 
supra note 32, at 1546–64; John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, A Buy-Side Model 
of M&A Lockups: Theory and Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REV. 307, 314–37 (2000); Sean J. Grif-
fith, Deal Protection Provisions in the Last Period of Play, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1963–
70 (2003); Che & Lewis, supra note 32, at 650–63; Shmuel Leshem, A Signaling Theory of 
Lockups in Mergers, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 45, 53–54, 60–61 (2012); Steven M. Davidoff 
& Christina M. Sautter, Lock-up Creep, 38 J. CORP. L. 681, 686–89, 695–98 (2013). All the 
formal analyses of deal protection devices, except for Che & Lewis, supra note 32, and 
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auction theory.35 The initial judicial hostility was against stock 
and asset lockups, but such deal protection devices are being used 
much less frequently, while termination fees and match rights 
have become quite prevalent.36 This Article foremost argues that, 
while deal protection devices can impede the target from being 
sold to the buyer with a higher valuation (i.e., they can generate 
allocative inefficiency), they can also increase the joint profit of 
the target and the inside buyer (the beneficiary of deal protection 
measures).37 Termination fees and match rights function quite 
 
Leshem, supra, however, assume (expressly or implicitly) that the inside buyer (benefi-
ciary of the deal protection device) and outside buyers are symmetrically informed of the 
respective valuations or only informally discuss the possibilities of private information. 
When we move away from the symmetric information assumption, important differences 
emerge among various deal protection devices. Also, as far as I am aware, this is the first 
Article to more formally analyze match rights using auction theory. Finally, when deal 
practitioners speak of deal protection devices or lockups, they also include many other 
mechanisms, such as no-shop (or go-shop) clauses, standstill agreements, information 
rights, and voting agreements. See, e.g., Davidoff & Sautter, supra, at 682, 711 (discussing 
a variety of lockups and arguing that the courts should broaden their analysis to other 
types of lockups). For the sake of brevity, this Article shies away from discussing these 
other mechanisms. 
 35 Auction theory has been used to analyze acquisitions and takeovers for quite some 
time. See generally Alan Schwartz & Peter Cramton, Using Auction Theory to Inform Take-
over Regulation, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 27 (1991); Che & Lewis, supra note 32; Choi & Talley, 
supra note 23. 
 36 According to Professors Lou Kling, Eileen Nugent, and Brandon Van Dyke, stock 
and asset lockups “have become [virtually] non-existent: asset lock-ups, because they gen-
erally fail the test of not unduly impeding the ability of third parties to make competing 
bids, and stock [lock-ups] because of the limitations placed on the economics of deal pro-
tection devices by the case law and the elimination of pooling accounting.” 1 LOU R. KLING, 
EILEEN T. NUGENT & BRANDON A. VAN DYKE, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, 
SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS § 4.04[6][b], at 4-93 (1992 & Supp. 2019) (citations omitted); 
see also Coates & Subramanian, supra note 34, at 356–57 (analyzing the tax difference for 
the first and second bidder); Davidoff & Sautter, supra note 34, at 686–87 (documenting 
the rise of match rights); Restrepo & Subramanian, supra note 31, at 1023, 1031–32 (show-
ing that “match rights have gone from approximately 60% of deals in 2003 to virtually 
100% of deals by 2015” among public company targets with deal value of $50 million or 
more); Subramanian & Zhao, supra note 31, at 1226–29 (demonstrating that in a recent 
sample of private equity acquisitions, 100% of the deals had a match right). It is not en-
tirely clear, however, why asset and stock lockups, in general, would be unduly impeding 
third parties, particularly when compared to a large termination fee. With respect to an 
asset lockup, an important difference is that the valuations of physical assets may differ 
among buyers. For a stock lockup, unlike a fixed termination fee, the size of the compen-
sation for the disappointed buyer depends directly on how much an outside buyer pays for 
the target. These differences, along with their implications, are more closely examined in 
Part III.E. 
 37 In a seminal work, Professors Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton showed how a 
supply contract with a termination fee can allow an existing seller and a buyer to erect a 
barrier against entry and also to extract rent from a more efficient entrant. Philippe Agh-
ion & Patrick Bolton, Contracts as a Barrier to Entry, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 388, 391 (1987). 
There are many other areas where a bilateral contract can be used to extract rent from a 
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differently, however. Both a sizable termination fee and an un-
limited match right can increase the joint return of the target and 
the inside buyer, but a large termination fee is likely to generate 
allocative inefficiency, while an unlimited match can actually pro-
mote allocative efficiency. Furthermore, in order to boost the target’s 
stand-alone return, a large termination fee requires a price con-
cession from the inside buyer (i.e., a higher deal price) while an 
unlimited match will likely increase the target’s stand-alone re-
turn even without a price concession. 
The basic insight can be explained as follows: With a termi-
nation fee, the target has to pay a fee in order to accept a more 
attractive offer from a third party. This not only forces a third 
party to pay more for the target (i.e., the size of pie gets bigger), 
but a chunk of that additional payment flows to the inside buyer 
as the promised fee. As the termination fee gets larger, the tar-
get’s return gets further depressed while the inside buyer enjoys 
a higher return. In order for the target to share that additional 
return, therefore, the target needs to receive a concession from 
the inside buyer through a higher deal price. The story is different 
with a match right. When a match right is limited (i.e., the inside 
buyer has an option to match a third party’s offers only a few 
times), given that there are no equivalent limitations on third-
party buyers and the target is not obligated to accept the buyer’s 
matched offer, this puts the inside buyer at a competitive disad-
vantage. With this uneven competition, the target’s return will be 
lower. When the match right is unlimited, by contrast, there will 
be more even competition between the inside buyer and third-
party buyers. Furthermore, unlike a termination fee, the higher 
proceeds go directly to the target, thereby increasing the target’s 
stand-alone return. 
The primary setting utilized in this Article is that of a “pri-
vate value” auction, in which each buyer knows how much it is 
willing to pay for the target. This Article also looks at the possi-
bility of the “winner’s curse” problem in an interdependent valu-
ation setting, where each buyer does not know—but only gets a 
signal about—how much it is willing to pay for the target. An in-
terdependent valuation setting does create the possibility of the 
“winner’s curse” problem, and this is likely to happen either when 
 
noncontracting third party. See, e.g., Albert Choi, Golden Parachute as a Compensation-
Shifting Mechanism, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 170, 173–74 (2004) (explaining that golden 
parachutes benefit both executives and shareholders because “the burden of takeover com-
pensation is partly born[e] by the buyer through a higher purchase price”). 
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there is a sizable termination fee or with a limited match right. 
With a sizable termination fee, a third-party buyer is forced to 
make a “jump” bid, a bid that is substantially higher than the deal 
price. Similarly, a limited match right forces the inside buyer to 
make a jump bid so as to preempt a third party’s follow-up bid. 
When concerned about the possibility of overpaying for the target, 
the bidder who is forced to make a jump bid may decline to par-
ticipate. By contrast, when there is no (or a small) termination fee 
or when the match right is unlimited, even in an interdependent 
valuation setting, the “winner’s curse” problem is unlikely to 
arise. This Article then briefly extends the analysis to the sce-
nario where the inside buyer has an informational advantage vis-
à-vis third-party buyers, and it also examines stock and asset 
lockups. 
Based on these findings, this Article argues that answering 
the questions (1) whether deal protection devices can maximize 
target shareholders’ return and (2) whether their presence under-
mines the reliance on deal price as an indicator of fair value in 
appraisal proceedings ultimately depends on whether the target 
directors (and managers) are properly incentivized to maximize 
the target shareholders’ return. If they are, termination fees and 
match rights can be utilized to enhance the return for the target 
shareholders. Furthermore, with the proper incentives in place, 
compared to the case without any deal protection measures, the 
deal price would be higher for the target shareholders, which, in 
turn, increases the confidence with which the court can use the 
deal price as evidence of fair value.38 At the opposite end of the 
incentive spectrum, when the target directors (and managers) are 
pursuing their own private gains at the expense of the target 
shareholders (e.g., when they are conflicted), such devices can be 
used to harm target shareholders, and the court should no longer 
rely on the deal price to determine the fair value of the target’s 
shares. 
This Article also examines deal protection devices from the 
perspective of contract law. Foremost, given that the devices can 
undermine competition between the inside buyer and a third 
party, under contract law, the court can inquire into whether they 
should be struck down as imposing “unreasonable” restraints on 
 
 38 This statement should not, however, be construed as a wholesale endorsement of 
using the deal price as evidence of fair value. There could be many reasons to suspect that 
the deal price, even as a product of an arm’s-length negotiation, would not protect the 
interest of the target shareholders. See generally Choi & Talley, supra note 23. 
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trade (or, more broadly, being against public policy). This type of 
reasoning has been used to cut down onerous noncompete 
clauses39 and unreasonably large liquidated damages. This Arti-
cle argues that such a public policy concern is higher with a large 
termination fee than with an unlimited match right. So long as 
the termination fee is relatively small (i.e., less than the expected 
return for the inside buyer under the deal terms), it does not en-
gender any allocative inefficiency. A large termination fee, by con-
trast, raises the specter of unduly undermining the competition 
between the inside buyer and a third party and steering the target 
to be sold to the initial buyer even when the initial buyer values 
the target less. An unlimited match right, by contrast, actually 
promotes more competition. This Article discusses factors that 
the court can utilize in determining whether a termination fee is 
“unreasonably” large. 
This Article is organized as follows: Part I offers a brief over-
view of the case law, focusing primarily on corporate law cases 
that examine deal protection devices. The overview starts from 
the seminal hostile takeover cases of Revlon and Paramount v. 
QVC and ends with very recent appraisal cases: DFC Global, Dell, 
Aruba, and their progeny (including AOL, In re Appraisal of Co-
lumbia Pipeline Group,40 and In re Stillwater Mining Co.41). 
Part II shows how match rights and termination fees are de-
ployed in practice. To aid the discussion, Part II looks at actual 
acquisition agreements used in recent transactions, including 
Nexstar Media Group’s acquisition of Tribune Media and Google 
LLC’s acquisition of Fitbit Inc. Part III presents an auction theory–
based analysis to examine various deal protection mechanisms, 
including termination fees, match rights, and stock and asset 
lockups. Part III demonstrates how certain devices can be used to 
maximize the target and initial buyer’s joint return by allowing 
the target and the initial buyer to extract surplus from a potential 
third-party buyer. The analysis is laid out with the help of nu-
merical examples. The numerical examples will highlight how 
match rights function differently from termination fees, and also 
how stock and asset lockups will likely generate allocative 
 
 39 See generally ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN 
TO LOVE LEAKS, RAIDS AND FREE RIDING (2013); Jonathan M. Barnett & Ted Sichelman, 
The Case for Noncompetes, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 953 (2020). 
 40 No. 12736-VCL, 2019 WL 3778370 (Del. Ch. 2019). 
 41 No. 2017-0385-JTL, 2019 WL 3943851 (Del. Ch. 2019). 
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inefficiency. Part IV, applying the analysis from Part III, discusses 
possible implications in both corporate and contract law. 
I.  A BRIEF CASE LAW HISTORY OF DEAL PROTECTION DEVICES 
This Part offers a brief overview of the cases that address deal 
protection devices in mergers and acquisitions. The overview is 
divided into two clusters. The first starts with the hostile take-
over cases in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the courts’ ex-
amination of deal protection devices in the context of satisfying 
target directors’ (and managers’) fiduciary duties. This line of 
cases ends with more recent permissive approaches that can be 
seen through cases such as Lyondell Chemical and C & J Energy 
Services. The other line of cases deals with the more recent con-
troversy over appraisal litigation and how the courts have at-
tempted to decide whether the presence of certain deal protection 
devices undermined the desirability of using the deal price itself 
as an indicator of fair value. The primary focus will be on the Del-
aware Supreme Court’s decisions in DFC Global, Dell, and Aruba, 
and how the Delaware Court of Chancery has applied the princi-
ples in later cases. 
A. Fiduciary Duty Cases 
The dispute and controversy over deal protection devices 
came to the fore during the hostile takeover era of the late 1980s 
and the early 1990s. The cases primarily focused on whether 
agreeing to certain deal protection measures led to a breach of 
fiduciary duties by the target directors. As evidenced by cases 
such as Revlon and Paramount v. QVC, the target and buyer cor-
porations attempted to exclude possible third-party bidders using 
deal protection devices, sometimes along with a poison pill. The 
devices that attracted the most attention were stock and asset 
lockups and termination fees. In Revlon, for instance, in order to 
thwart a hostile takeover attempt by MacAndrews & Forbes, 
Revlon (the target) brought in Forstmann Little (a private equity 
shop) as a “white knight” defender while promising, among other 
things, an asset lockup that allowed Forstmann Little to acquire 
some of Revlon’s most valuable businesses at a below-market 
price in case Forstmann Little was unable to acquire Revlon.42 In 
 
 42 Under the asset lockup provision of the agreement, if a third party acquired 40% 
or more of Revlon’s stock, Forstmann Little would be entitled “to purchase Revlon’s Vision 
Care and National Health Laboratories divisions for $525 million, some $100–175 million 
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Paramount, favoring Viacom Inc. over QVC Network Inc. as the deal 
partner, Paramount Communications Inc. (the target) promised 
Viacom a right to acquire Paramount stock at a below-market 
price (a stock lockup) in case Viacom was unable to close the 
transaction.43 Viacom could also collect a $100 million termina-
tion fee.44 In both cases, the Delaware Supreme Court viewed the 
deal protection devices quite harshly, ultimately forcing the target 
corporations to eliminate them and try to run a fair auction 
among the buyers.45 
The height of judicial hostility against deal protection devices 
was represented by the case of Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, 
Inc.46 The Delaware Supreme Court, in that case, struck down a 
combination of deal protection devices, including a no-shop 
clause, a termination fee, and a force-the-vote provision (which 
did not have a fiduciary out termination right) as breaching the 
fiduciary duties of NCS Healthcare’s (the target’s) directors.47 
 
below the value ascribed to them by Lazard Freres” (Revlon’s financial advisor). See 
Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178. Part III.E.2 analyzes asset lockups in more detail and shows how 
an asset lockup, to the extent that it reduces an outside buyer’s reservation value more 
than an inside buyer’s reservation value (due, for instance, to the loss of synergy value), 
is more problematic than other deal protection devices, not only because it can engender 
allocative inefficiency but also because it is quite unlikely to allow the target to increase 
its return from sale. 
 43 Paramount, 637 A.2d at 39. 
 44 See id. There were three important deal protection devices used in the deal. First 
was the no-shop provision. Second was the termination fee of $100 million, which would 
be triggered if (a) there were a competing transaction; (b) Paramount shareholders re-
jected the merger; or (c) the Paramount board recommended a competing transaction. 
Third was the stock option agreement, under which Viacom had an option to purchase 
about 19.9% of Paramount’s outstanding stock at $69.14 per share if any of the triggering 
events of the termination fee occurred. “Viacom was permitted to pay for the shares with 
a senior subordinated note of questionable marketability instead of cash,” or could require 
Paramount to pay in cash “the difference between the purchase price and the market price 
of Paramount’s stock” (the “put feature”). Id. Given that both QVC and Viacom were offer-
ing about $90 per share for Paramount’s stock, being able to acquire Paramount stock at 
$69.14 (with subordinated debt and put options) was a very attractive option for Viacom. 
See Part III.E. for an auction theory–based analysis of stock lockups. 
 45 See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 185 (upholding the lower court injunction of the deal pro-
tection measures); Paramount, 637 A.2d at 51 (invalidating the no-shop and stock option 
provisions of Paramount’s contract with Viacom). According to Professors Subramanian 
and John Coates, the incidence of asset lockups and stock lockups dropped significantly 
after Revlon, Paramount, and Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 
1989). See Coates & Subramanian, supra note 34, at 326–30. 
 46 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003). 
 47 Id. at 925–26, 936. The case is unique in the sense that there was a group of controlling 
shareholders (defendants Jon Outcalt and Kevin Shaw, who were both directors and offic-
ers of NCS Healthcare, Inc., and owned 65% of the voting power) who also entered into a 
voting agreement with Genesis (the initial buyer), under which Outcalt and Shaw granted 
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Perhaps in response to the judicial hostility, stock and asset lock-
ups would gradually disappear over time (at least) in public com-
pany mergers. Termination fees, however, would remain in the 
landscape.48 In Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp.,49 the Delaware Su-
preme Court permitted a termination fee as a proper means of 
compensating a disappointed buyer.50 Even though the termina-
tion fee (to be paid by the target Bell Atlantic) was $550 million, 
the court ruled that it did not violate the directors’ fiduciary obli-
gations nor contract law’s antipenalty principle, partly because 
the fee constituted only about 2% of Bell Atlantic’s market capi-
talization. In subsequent cases, while being lenient toward the 
presence of a termination fee, courts have been a bit more vigilant 
toward its size. For instance, in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus 
Amax Minerals Co.,51 the Delaware Court of Chancery criticized 
a 6.3% termination fee as “seem[ing] to stretch the definition of 
range of reasonableness . . . beyond its breaking point.”52 More re-
cently, in In re Comverge, Inc.,53 the Delaware Court of Chancery 
characterized a 5.6% termination fee as “test[ing] the limits of 
what this Court has found to be within a reasonable range for 
termination fees.”54 
 
Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., an irrevocable proxy. Id. at 926. Without a fiduciary ter-
mination right (which would have allowed NCS Healthcare to cancel the shareholders’ 
meeting when consistent with their fiduciary obligations), even if the directors of NCS 
Healthcare were to change its recommendation to the shareholders, which, in fact, they 
did, due to the voting agreement, Genesis would still have been able to close the deal. Id. 
at 936. 
 48 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 49 695 A.2d 43 (Del. 1997). 
 50 Id. at 50. According to Coates and Subramanian, the incidence of termination fees 
jumped from 33% to 65% after the case. See Coates & Subramanian, supra note 34, at 331. 
 51 Nos. CIV.A. 17398, CIV.A. 17383, CIV.A. 17427, 1999 WL 1054255 (Del. Ch.  
Sept. 27, 1999). 
 52 Id. at *2. 
 53 No. 7368-VCP, 2014 WL 6686570 (Del. Ch. Nov. 25, 2014). 
 54 Id. at *14. As Subramanian and Professor Fernán Restrepo summarize: 
In this case, the merger agreement provided for a two-tier termination fee under 
which Comverge (the target company) would pay HIG (the bidder) $1.206 mil-
lion if Comverge entered into a superior transaction during the go-shop period 
and $1.93 million if it did so after the expiration of the go-shop period. In addi-
tion, Comverge would reimburse HIG for expenses up to $1.5 million in either 
scenario. The total payable to HIG would then be 5.6% of the deal equity value 
before the expiration of the go-shop period and 7% afterward. The court noted 
that even the lower bound of this range was high and further added that this 
was true even for microcap acquisitions (where, as reflected in the opinions  
discussed above, there is somewhat more flexibility with respect to the size of 
termination fees). 
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Dealmakers also began experimenting with other types of 
deal protection devices, one of which was a match right. As seen 
in the GPC-Essendant transaction, a match right, when re-
quested by the buyer (the right holder), obligates the target cor-
poration to negotiate in good faith in allowing the buyer to match 
the third party’s offer so as to render the third party’s offer no 
longer superior. An important doctrinal development took place 
in In re Toys “R” Us. When Toys “R” Us, Inc. (the target), agreed 
to sell most of its toy business to Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. 
(KKR), they agreed to various deal protection mechanisms, in-
cluding a 3.75% termination fee and an unlimited three-day 
match right.55 Under the latter, Toys “R” Us had an obligation to 
negotiate in good faith with KKR for three business days to allow 
KKR to revise its offer, and there was no limit on how many  
times KKR could exercise the right.56 When the shareholders of 
Toys “R” Us challenged the deal protection measures, the Dela-
ware Court of Chancery upheld their validity, stating: “[N]either 
a termination fee nor a matching right is per se invalid. Each is a 
common contractual feature that, when assented to by a board 
fulfilling its fundamental duties of loyalty and care for the proper 
purpose of securing a high value bid for the stockholders, has le-
gal legitimacy.”57 Resting upon the holdings of Brazen and Toys 
“R” Us, by now the two most frequently used deal protection 
 
Restrepo & Subramanian, supra note 31, at 1025–26 (citations omitted). While the size of 
the termination fee raises some interesting issues, there does not seem to be a clear-cut 
guideline from the cases. At the same time, practitioners seem to have converged on the 
range of 3 to 5% (of the deal price) as being reasonable. See id. at 1026. One factor that 
drives the size presumably is the respective bargaining power between the buyer and the 
seller. See Adam B. Badawi & Elisabeth de Fontenay, Is There a First-Drafter Advantage 
in M&A?, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1119, 1154–55 (2019) (showing how one party having the 
first-drafter advantage affects various deal provisions). 
 55 In re Toys “R” Us, 877 A.2d at 997. The final merger agreement 
contained four deal protection measures: 1) a fixed termination fee of $247.5 mil-
lion, equal to 3.75% of equity value or 3.25% of enterprise value—payable for the 
most part only if the Company terminated the merger agreement in order to sign 
up another acquisition proposal within a year [a tail period]; 2) an agreement to 
pay up to $30 million in documented expenses after a naked no vote [i.e., if the 
Toys “R” Us shareholders vote down the proposal even in the absence of a com-
peting proposal]; 3) a relatively non-restrictive no-shop clause that permitted 
the consideration of unsolicited bids; and 4) a temporally-limited [three-day] 
match right. 
Id. In the deal, the match right was given as part of the fiduciary out exception to the no-
shop covenant. Id. at 996–97. 
 56 Id. at 997. For a more detailed discussion of match rights, see infra Part II.B. 
 57 In re Toys “R” Us, 877 A.2d at 1017. 
2021] Deal Protection Devices 773 
 
devices in acquisition transactions with publicly traded target 
corporations seem to be a right to match a third party’s bid and a 
termination fee.58 
A couple of subsequent cases seemed to put the courts in a 
more lenient posture regarding deal protection in answering 
whether the target directors might have breached their fiduciary 
duties. In Lyondell Chemical, the buyer, Basell AF, controlled by 
Leonard Blavatnik, made an offer to cash out all the shares of 
Lyondell Chemical Co. at $48 per share, thereby putting the deal 
in the Revlon mode.59 The merger agreement also included vari-
ous deal protection measures, including a $385 million termina-
tion fee (which constituted about 3% of the equity value of the 
transaction), a no-shop clause with a fiduciary out, and a match 
right for Basell.60 When the plaintiff-shareholders challenged the 
transaction, arguing, among others, that the deal protection 
measures were preclusive and coercive, and the defendants 
moved for summary judgment, the Delaware Court of Chancery 
denied the motion, stating that whether the directors breached 
their fiduciary duties under Revlon raised various questions of 
fact.61 The Delaware Supreme Court reversed, however.62 While 
not specifically focusing on the deal protection measures, the 
Court stated that “there are no legally prescribed steps that di-
rectors must follow to satisfy their Revlon duties. Thus, the direc-
tors’ failure to take any specific steps during the sale process could 
not have demonstrated a conscious disregard of their duties.”63 
Similarly, in C & J Energy Services, which also involved a 
match right and a $65 million termination fee, the Delaware Su-
preme Court overturned the Chancery Court’s injunctive order for 
the target (C & J Energy Services) to actively shop itself. While 
not focusing specifically on the deal protection measures, the 
Court stated: 
 
 58 See supra note 36 and accompanying text; see also Fernán Restrepo & Guhan 
Subramanian, The Effect of Prohibiting Deal Protection in Mergers and Acquisitions: Evi-
dence from the United Kingdom, 60 J.L. & ECON. 75, 88 (2017) (empirically examining the 
effect of the U.K.’s banning of deal protection devices on mergers and acquisitions acti-
vities); Coates & Subramanian, supra note 34, at 331 (outlining an earlier empirical study 
of buy-side lockups). 
 59 See Lyondell I, 2008 WL 2923427, at *6. 
 60 Id. at *8 & n.35. 
 61 Id. at *18. 
 62 See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan (Lyondell II), 970 A.2d 235, 244 (Del. 2009). 
 63 Id. at 243. 
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Revlon and its progeny do not set out a specific route that a 
board must follow when fulfilling its fiduciary duties. . . . 
When a board exercises its judgment in good faith, tests the 
transaction through a viable passive market check, and gives 
its stockholders a fully informed, uncoerced opportunity to 
vote to accept the deal, we cannot conclude that the board 
likely violated its Revlon duties.64 
Finally, with respect to the question whether deal protection 
devices can deter third parties from competing against the buyer (i.e., 
undermine a post-signing market check), the Court stated that a 
post-signing market check is effective “so long as interested bidders 
have a fair opportunity to present a higher-value alternative, and 
the board has the flexibility to eschew the original transaction 
and accept the higher-value deal.”65 
In sum, the line of fiduciary duty cases, from Revlon and  
Paramount v. QVC to Lyondell Chemical and C & J Energy Ser-
vices, seems to indicate that when the transaction is viewed from 
the issue of whether the target directors have breached their fi-
duciary duties (under Revlon or Unocal), over time the courts 
seem to have taken a more permissive approach toward deal  
protection measures. At the same time, the Omnicare case (along 
with Revlon and Paramount) tells us that it is possible for certain 
(combinations of) deal protection measures to be “preclusive and 
coercive”66 or to constitute a breach of directors’ fiduciary duty.67 
Unfortunately, however, where that line is has yet to be answered 
in a satisfactory manner.68 
 
 64 C & J Energy Servs., 107 A.3d at 1053. 
 65 Id. at 1067–68. 
 66 Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 936. 
 67 Paramount, 637 A.2d at 51–52. 
 68 According to Kling, Nugent, and Van Dyke, a crucial aspect to this question is 
whether the deal protection devices can “unduly” deter third parties from making compet-
ing bids: 
[T]he economics of the executed agreement must be such that it does not unduly 
impede the ability of third parties to make competing bids. Types of arrange-
ments that might raise questions in this regard include asset lock-ups, stock 
lock-ups, no-shops, force-the-vote provisions, and termination fees. The opera-
tive word is “unduly;” the impact will vary depending upon the actual type of 
device involved and its specific terms. 
KLING, NUGENT & VAN DYKE, supra note 36, at 4-91 (emphasis in original). 
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B. The Recent Appraisal Controversy 
While the fiduciary duty case law has taken a more permis-
sive direction on deal protection measures, a recent controversy 
surrounding target shareholders’ right to an appraisal has 
breathed a new perspective into the issue.69 Unlike the previous 
line of cases that focused on the target directors’ fiduciary duties 
(including Revlon duties), appraisal cases raise a different set of 
questions: What is the fair value of the target’s shares, and how 
should courts determine that fair value? The recent controversy 
on the appraisal remedy had to do with whether, and under what 
circumstances, the court can use the deal price itself as an indi-
cator of fair value. Long dissatisfied with the perceived arbitrari-
ness in how the courts determined fair value (which, on occasion, 
substantially exceeded both the deal price70 and the preannounce-
ment stock price), certain practitioners and scholars have advo-
cated that the court use the deal price itself as an indicator of fair 
value in an “arm’s-length” transaction. The Delaware Supreme 
Court, in DFC Global and Dell, largely agreed. In Dell, for in-
stance, the Court noted that when there is a large public float of 
the target company’s (Dell’s) stock with many analysts following, 
when the deal is done on an arm’s-length basis, and when the deal 
is shopped with numerous potential buyers, the Chancery Court 
will be abusing its discretion by not using the deal price (or even 
the pre-signing market price) as a “relevant factor” in determin-
ing fair value.71 
In short, DFC Global and Dell seem to dictate that courts use 
the deal price as an indicator (but perhaps not an exclusive indi-
cator) of fair value when certain conditions are met, although nei-
ther case seems to clearly lay out what the sufficient or necessary 
conditions are. And, this is where deal protection devices come 
into play: in determining if there has been sufficient competition 
 
 69 In Delaware, target shareholders who dissent from (or do not vote in favor of) cer-
tain types of mergers are entitled to ask the Chancery Court to appraise the fair value of 
their shares and receive that value in cash from the surviving corporation. See DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2020). For an overview and how using the deal price (merger price) can 
decrease target shareholders’ expected return, see generally Choi & Talley, supra note 23. 
 70 See Choi & Talley, supra note 23, at 564 (finding under an auction-theoretic model 
that fair-value assessments tend to exceed the deal price). For instance, in the case of Dell, 
the Delaware Court of Chancery, applying the discounted cash flow analysis, determined 
that the fair value of Dell’s shares was $17.62, substantially higher than the deal price of 
$13.75, which, in turn, was about 37% higher than the company’s 90-day-average unaf-
fected stock price. See Dell, 177 A.3d at 5. 
 71 Dell, 177 A.3d at 20–21. 
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for the target corporation (especially after the agreement has 
been signed).72 Presumably, if the deal is too tightly locked up, so 
as to deter any interested third-party buyer from competing 
against the inside buyer, there is no market for the target cor-
poration and the deal price (agreed to between the inside buyer 
and the target without any external market pressure) would be-
come much less reliable in determining what the fair value of the 
target stock is. 
The case of In re AOL directly addresses this issue. The Del-
aware Court of Chancery, in determining the fair value of AOL 
Inc.’s stock, declined to use the deal price as an indicator of fair 
value due to, among other things, the presence of deal protection 
devices. The acquisition agreement between Verizon Communi-
cations Inc. (the buyer) and AOL (the target) included a no-shop 
provision, a 3.5% termination fee of $150 million, and an unlim-
ited three-day matching right for Verizon.73 Although AOL was 
entitled to accept a “superior proposal” from any third party (a 
standard fiduciary out exception to a no-shop clause), no compet-
ing buyer emerged.74 The court, citing the presence of deal protec-
tion devices and other problematic issues, such as a statement by 
Tim Armstrong (AOL’s CEO) that he was “committed to doing the 
deal with Verizon,”75 concluded that the sale process was not “Dell 
Compliant,”76 and the deal price could not be used as relevant 
 
 72 In this sense, the issue addressed in appraisal cases is different from that raised 
in fiduciary duty cases. In appraisal cases, the relevant question with respect to deal pro-
tection devices is whether their presence leads to our confidence in using the deal price as 
an indicator of fair value. By contrast, in fiduciary duty cases, the relevant question is 
whether their presence indicates the target directors’ breach of fiduciary duties (including 
Revlon duties). Notwithstanding the difference, some have argued that the analysis should 
be similar. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, Finding the Right 
Balance in Appraisal Litigation: Deal Prices, Deal Process, and Synergies, 73 BUS. LAW. 
961, 962 (2018) (arguing that “the Delaware courts’ treatment of the use of the deal price 
to determine fair value does and should mirror the treatment of shareholder class action 
fiduciary duty litigation”). Others have argued that the questions should be treated differ-
ently. See, e.g., Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Flawed Corporate Finance of Dell 
and DFC Global, 68 EMORY L.J. 221, 269 (2018) (arguing that Dell and DFC Global “con-
flate questions of fiduciary [duty] liability with the valuation questions central to ap-
praisal disputes”). 
 73 In re AOL, 2018 WL 1037450, at *7. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at *9. 
 76 According to the court, a transaction is “Dell Compliant” when “(i) information was 
sufficiently disseminated to potential bidders, so that (ii) an informed sale could take 
place, (iii) without undue impediments imposed by the deal structure itself.” Id. at *8. 
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evidence of fair value.77 The court, instead, applied the discounted 
cash flow analysis (as many courts have done in the past) to de-
termine AOL’s fair value.78 
Three more recent cases, Aruba, Columbia Pipeline, and 
Stillwater Mining, all decided in 2019, put an additional interpre-
tive wrinkle on deal protection devices in appraisal actions.79 In 
all three cases, while there are some factual variations, the target 
corporation pursued a strategy of negotiating with one buyer 
(known as the “single-buyer strategy”) and adopted deal protec-
tion measures that included both a termination fee and an unlim-
ited match right.80 In none of these cases did a competing buyer 
emerge after the agreement was signed. Notwithstanding the 
presence of deal protection devices, in all three cases, the court 
determined that, after closely examining the respective negotia-
tion history, the price was the reliable measure of fair value. In 
the process of coming to that conclusion, the Columbia Pipeline 
and Stillwater Mining courts focused on several indicia of relia-
bility: (1) the fact that the merger was an arm’s-length transac-
tion; (2) the target directors did not face any (material) conflicts 
of interest; (3) the buyer conducted due diligence and received 
confidential information about the target’s value; (4) the target 
negotiated with the buyer and extracted multiple price increases; 
and (5) most importantly, no bidders emerged during the 
postsigning phase.81 Particularly with respect to the fifth factor, 
according to the Stillwater Mining court, the nonemergence of a 
 
 77 According to the court, “Armstrong’s post-Agreement statements to the press 
about giving his ‘word’ to Verizon could reasonably cause potential bidders to pause when 
combined with the deal protections here.” Id. at *9 (emphasis added). In Dell, the termina-
tion fee was about 1% of Dell’s market capitalization, the buyer was given a one-time 
matching right, and there was a 45-day go-shop period. Dell, 177 A.3d at 12. By contrast, 
in In re AOL, the termination fee was about 3.5% of AOL’s market capitalization and Ver-
izon was given an unlimited matching right. According to the court, “[c]umulatively, these 
factors make for a considerable risk of informational and structural disadvantages dis-
suading any prospective bidder.” In re AOL, 2018 WL 1037450, at *9. 
 78 In re AOL, 2018 WL 1037450, at *10. 
 79 See In re Panera Bread Co., No. 2017-0593-MTZ, 2020 WL 506684, at *29 (Del. 
Ch. Jan. 31, 2020) (applying similar analysis to match rights and termination fees in an 
appraisal proceeding). 
 80 For instance, in Aruba, the target (Aruba Networks, Inc.) had agreed to an unlim-
ited match right, which gave the buyer (Hewlett-Packard Co.) five days to match the first 
superior offer and two days to match any subsequent increase. There also was a termina-
tion fee of $90 million, representing 3% of Aruba’s equity value. See Verition Partners 
Master Fund, Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., No. 11448–VCL, 2018 WL 922139, at *38 (Del. 
Ch. Feb. 15, 2018). 
 81 In re Stillwater Mining, 2019 WL 3943851, at *22–23; Columbia Pipeline, 2019 
WL 3778370, at *25–26. 
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competing buyer was deemed to be “highly significant” in its con-
clusion that the deal price was a reliable indicator.82 
Two salient patterns seem to emerge from the recent ap-
praisal cases. First, the courts seem to rely more on the deal price 
to determine fair value when certain conditions are satisfied. This 
is to the exclusion of other measures, such as the discounted cash 
flow measure or the unaffected (pre–merger announcement) mar-
ket price. Second, and more importantly for our purposes, courts 
do not seem less inclined to use the deal price as an indicator of 
fair value when certain measures, such as a termination fee and 
a match right, are present. With respect to match rights, however, 
the debate remains. For instance, according to the Delaware 
Court of Chancery in the Dell appraisal litigation, an unlimited 
match right is a “powerful disincentive” against a third-party bid-
der’s making a topping bid.83 According to Professor Guhan 
Subramanian, “[t]he match right [ ] fuels the winner’s curse prob-
lem: in any scenario where a third party bids and wins, it would 
know that a better-informed party (namely, the initial bidder) 
thought that the price was too high. Looking forward and reason-
ing back, a third party would be unlikely to bid.”84 Furthermore, 
 
 82 In re Stillwater Mining, 2019 WL 3943851, at *23. In emphasizing this factor, the 
court relied on the reasoning from Aruba and Dell. In Aruba, the Delaware Supreme Court 
had stated: “It cannot be that an open chance for buyers to bid signals a market failure 
simply because buyers do not believe the asset on sale is sufficiently valuable for them to 
engage in a bidding contest against each other.” Aruba, 210 A.3d at 136. Similarly, in Dell, 
the court had found that the absence of a (postsigning) higher bid meant “that the deal 
market was already robust and that a topping bid involved a serious risk of overpayment,” 
which “suggests the [deal] price is already at a level that is fair.” Dell, 177 A.3d at 33. 
 83 See In re Appraisal of Dell, No. 9322–VCL, 2016 WL 3186538, at *41 (Del. Ch. May 
31, 2016); see also Merion Cap. L.P. v. Lender Processing Servs., Inc., No. 9320-VCL, 2016 
WL 7324170, at *25 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016) (“[T]he existence of an incumbent trade bidder 
holding an unlimited match right was a sufficient deterrent to prevent other parties from 
perceiving a realistic path to success. . . . Without a realistic path to success, it made no 
sense to get involved.”); Blueblade Cap. Opportunities LLC v. Norcraft Cos., No. 11184-
VCS, 2018 WL 3602940, at *22 (Del. Ch. Jul. 27, 2018) (citing Subramanian for the prop-
osition that “unlimited match rights are typically perceived as limiting any ‘pathway to 
success.’ . . . ‘[E]verybody agrees that match rights deter bids. It is not even a debated 
question’” (alteration omitted)); In re Panera Bread Co., 2020 WL 506684, at *21 (citing 
an investment banker’s testimony that “even customary matching rights may discourage 
in a way and make it more challenging for other bidders to come forward” (quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 84 See Subramanian & Zhao, supra note 31, at 1234. See supra note 31 for more dis-
cussion on winner’s curse problem associated with unlimited match right. For an analysis 
of how an unlimited match right can be modeled as an English auction and concluding 
that the winner’s curse problem does not arise in an English auction setting even if the 
outside buyer has an informational disadvantage compared to the inside buyer, see infra 
Part III.B, D. 
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courts are willing to rely more on the deal price when no compet-
ing buyer emerges after the agreement is signed. At least in theory, 
this is puzzling since the absence of a competing buyer can be the 
result of one of two things: either that the deal price is already 
sufficiently high so that no other third party is willing to offer 
more, or that even though the deal price itself is not sufficiently 
high, the deal protection devices successfully discourage other 
buyers from emerging.85 
II.  MATCH RIGHTS AND TERMINATION FEES IN ACTION 
This Part discusses, in more detail, how deal protection devi-
ces—match rights and termination fees in particular—are used 
in practice. While there are many different types of deal protec-
tion measures, we can roughly divide them into two categories. 
The first type (like a termination fee or a stock or asset lockup) 
tries to compensate the disappointed buyer, while the second type 
(like a match right or a no-shop provision) tries to more directly 
control the target’s behavior. The first type of device allows the 
disappointed purchaser to receive some financial compensation 
from the target in case the deal does not close and the target is 
sold to a different buyer. Stock or asset lockups, for instance, allow 
a disappointed buyer to acquire the target corporation’s stock or 
asset at a previously agreed-upon, favorable price.86 A target ter-
mination fee would stipulate a dollar amount that the disappoin-
ted buyer can collect from the target in case the target is sold to 
a different buyer.87 
 
 85 Professor Subramanian has argued, for instance, that the presence of an unlimited 
match right can undermine the reliability of the deal price as an indicator of fair value. 
According to him, “an exclusive pre-signing negotiation followed by a go-shop process in 
which the buyer gets an unlimited match right would probably not qualify for deference 
to the deal price.” See Subramanian, supra note 31, at 226. 
 86 While the primary focus of this Article is on match rights and termination fees, I 
briefly examine the impact of stock and asset lockups in Part III.E. In theory, poison pills 
can also function as a deal protection device that compensate a disappointed buyer since, 
when triggered, they allow the inside buyer to purchase the target’s stock at an attractive 
price. 
 87 Sometimes, the purchaser corporation is obligated to make a fee payment to the 
target; this is known as the reverse breakup (or reverse or buyer termination) fee. Such a 
provision is most often used when the deal cannot close due to the purchaser’s inability to 
satisfy the financing needs or inability to secure regulatory (such as antitrust or securities) 
approval. See, e.g., Choi & Wickelgren, supra note 15, at 1–2. Unlike a target termination 
fee, a reverse termination fee does not involve the presence of a third party buyer or seller. 
In that sense, a reverse termination fee functions more like an incentive device (to secure 
antitrust approval or line up necessary financing, for instance). 
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The second type of device attempts to influence or control the 
target’s preclosing behavior. The mechanism used most often is 
known as the no-shop (or nonsolicitation) clause, which prohibits 
the target from directly (or indirectly) soliciting a competing bid 
from a third party.88 Others include covenant provisions that re-
quire the target corporation to hold a shareholders meeting—re-
gardless of whether the target board decides to change its recom-
mendation to the shareholders (a “force the vote” covenant),89 not 
to change its recommendation to the shareholders (a “no change 
in recommendation” covenant), or to exert necessary efforts, such 
as “best efforts,” in securing various approvals, such as those from 
the government entities or other contracting parties. At the same 
time, given that the target’s directors owe fiduciary obligations to 
the corporation and their shareholders, it is common for no-shop 
or other protective clauses (such as the no change in recommen-
dation covenant) to conditionally allow the directors to consider 
an unsolicited bid and engage with a third-party bidder in case 
the bid is more attractive. Another often-used device is a match 
right. Often combined with other covenants, such as a no change 
in recommendation or no-shop covenant, a match right allows the 
buyer to match a competing bid, so as to make the competing bid 
no longer more attractive to the target shareholders. 
Given the emergence of termination fees and match rights as 
two of the most visible and frequently used deal protection mech-
anisms,90 this Part focuses on them, with the help of some recent 
mergers and acquisitions transactions: Nexstar Media’s acquisition 
 
 88 See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT FOR THE ACQUISITION OF A 
PUBLIC COMPANY § 4.4, at 148–50 (2011) [hereinafter ABA MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT]. 
At the other end of the spectrum, there is a “go-shop” clause, which allows or even obligates 
the target corporation to shop the deal around for a prespecified duration. Go-shop periods 
can kick in either before or after the agreement has been signed. See, e.g., Dell, 177 A.3d 
at 12. Although there is an interesting debate as to how effective a go-shop provision is 
and whether it allows the target directors to satisfactorily discharge their fiduciary duties 
(in getting the maximum price possible), this Article is focused on deal protection devices. 
For a recent analysis of go-shop provisions, see Subramanian & Zhao, supra note 31,  
at 1226–31. 
 89 Under Delaware law, a target company can agree to such a provision even if its 
board were to change its recommendation to the shareholders. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 146 (2020). 
 90 See supra note 36. 
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of Tribune Media91 and Google’s acquisition of Fitbit.92 This Part 
also looks at the American Bar Association’s Model Merger Agree-
ment.93 The transactions contemplate a reverse triangular merger 
structure, in which the purchaser (the “Parent”) lets one of its 
wholly owned subsidiaries (the “Merger Sub”) merge with a pub-
licly traded target corporation (the “Company”), with the target 
corporation as the surviving entity. I will first closely examine the 
match rights used in the agreements and then turn to termina-
tion fees. 
A. Target Termination Fee 
In contrast to a match right, a termination fee does not attempt 
to directly influence the target’s or the buyer’s behavior. Rather, 
it allows a disappointed buyer to receive financial compensation 
when certain conditions are satisfied. The most common condi-
tions are the target’s consummation of an alternative or compet-
ing transaction or the target board’s changing its recommenda-
tion to its shareholders due to the emergence of a competing 
bidder with a superior offer. As can be inferred from its name, a 
termination fee provision is intimately tied with the right to ter-
minate the agreement.94 
For instance, in the Nexstar-Tribune transaction, Nexstar is 
entitled to collect a $135 million termination fee from Tribune if 
certain conditions are satisfied, the most important one of which 
is if Tribune enters into an alternative transaction with a third 
party.95 For instance, § 9.1 of the agreement, titled “Termination,” 
lays out the circumstances under which the agreement can be 
 
 91 See generally Nexstar Media Group, Inc., Agreement and Plan of Merger Among 
Tribune Media Company, Nexstar Media Group, Inc. and Titan Merger Sub, Inc. (Form 8-K, 
Exhibit 2.1) (Dec. 4, 2018) [hereinafter Nexstar-Tribune Merger Agreement]. 
 92 See generally Fitbit, Inc., Agreement and Plan of Merger by and Among Fitbit, 
Inc., Google LLC and Magnoliophyta Inc. (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1) (Nov. 1, 2019) [herein-
after Google-Fitbit Merger Agreement]. 
 93 See generally ABA MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 88. 
 94 Taking one step back, before one party has the right to terminate the contract, 
there is usually a nonsatisfaction of a condition. A change in the target board’s recommen-
dation, for instance, will first function as a nonsatisfaction of this condition, which will, in 
turn, give the purchaser the right to terminate the agreement and to collect a termination 
fee. See, e.g., ABA MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 88, § 7.3(b), at 276–77. 
 95 Nexstar-Tribune Merger Agreement, supra note 91, § 9.3(a), at 78–79. By compar-
ison, in the Google-Fitbit transaction, if Fitbit were to enter into a competing transaction 
or Fitbit’s board were to change its recommendation to its stockholders, Google is entitled 
to receive a termination fee of $80 million, which is roughly about 3.8% of the deal value 
of $2.1 billion. See Google-Fitbit Merger Agreement, supra note 92, § 8.03(a)(i), at 86. 
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terminated. It allows Nexstar to terminate the agreement when 
a “Triggering Company Event” has occurred,96 which is defined to 
include either Tribune’s board making a change in its recommen-
dation to its shareholders (a “Company Adverse Recommendation 
Change”) or Tribune entering into a transaction with a third 
party (an “Alternative Company Acquisition Agreement”).97 
With respect to the payment of the $135 million termination 
fee, § 9.3(a)(i) states, in relevant part, that if the agreement is 
terminated for either of those reasons, “the Company shall pay to 
Parent . . . a fee in the amount of $135 million (the “Company Ter-
mination Fee”) at or prior to the termination of this Agreement.”98 
In the previous Part, we saw that Tribune’s board is allowed to 
change its recommendation to the shareholders in response to a 
superior offer from a third party. Sections 9.1 and 9.3 impose an 
obligation on Tribune to pay a $135 million termination fee if ei-
ther Tribune’s board changes its recommendation in response to 
a third party’s offer or sells itself to a third party. Given the fact 
that as of the date of the merger announcement Tribune was val-
ued at about $4.1 billion, a $135 million termination fee consti-
tuted about 3.3% of the deal value.99 
An important condition with respect to the payment of a ter-
mination fee is that it expressly envisions the target entering into 
a competing transaction. Furthermore, when the condition is satis-
fied and the agreement has been terminated, the buyer is not simply 
entitled to recover its fees and expenses. In fact, the agreements 
usually stipulate other occasions when the buyer is entitled to 
only be reimbursed for its expenses. For instance, in the Nexstar-
Tribune agreement, § 9.3(b) states that: 
If this Agreement is terminated by Parent or the Company 
[in response to the Company shareholders’ failure to adopt 
the agreement], then the Company shall pay to Parent . . . an 
amount equal to the documented out of pocket costs and ex-
penses, including any commitment fees under the Commit-
ment Letter and the fees and expenses of counsel, accoun-
tants, investment bankers, Financing Sources, experts and 
 
 96 Nexstar-Tribune Merger Agreement, supra note 91, § 9.1(c)(i), at 77. 
 97 Id. § 1.1, at 3, 13. 
 98 Id. § 9.3(a)(i), at 78 (emphasis omitted). 
 99 See Tribune Media Co., Nexstar Media Group Enters into Definitive Agreement to 
Acquire Tribune Media Company for $6.4 Billion in Accretive Transaction Creating the 
Nation’s Largest Local Television Broadcaster and Local Media Company (Form 8-K, Ex-
hibit 99-1) (Dec. 3, 2018) [hereinafter Exhibit 99-1]. 
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consultants, incurred by Parent in connection with this 
Agreement and the transactions contemplated by this Agree-
ment in an amount not to exceed $15,000,000 (the “Parent 
Expenses”) as promptly as practicable (and, in any event, 
within two (2) Business Days following such termination).100 
As this section makes clear, if the proposal goes to a shareholder 
vote and the Tribune shareholders do not approve the merger, 
Nexstar is entitled to have only its expenses (broadly construed) 
reimbursed and the total reimbursement is capped at $15 million, 
substantially below the termination fee of $135 million in the 
event Tribune enters into a competing transaction with a third 
party.101 A large termination fee that is triggered when a target 
enters into a competing transaction and allows the disappointed 
buyer to recover substantially more than its expenses and fees 
does much more than simply trying to make the disappointed 
buyer whole and to protect its reliance interest.102 
 
 100 Nexstar-Tribune Merger Agreement, supra note 91, § 9.3(b), at 79. For the role of 
the shareholders’ vote in the right of either the Parent or the Company to terminate, see 
id. § 9.1(b)(iii), at 77. 
 101 An important variation on the expense reimbursement in case the target share-
holders reject the deal is what is known as the “naked no vote” or “no vote” fee. Under such 
a provision, the buyer will be entitled to collect a stipulated amount from the target. Un-
like the Tribune-Nexstar deal, the Google-Fitbit transaction employs a naked no vote pro-
vision. Section 8.03(a)(ii) of the agreement states that, in case Fitbit shareholders do not 
approve the transaction and the agreement is terminated either by Fitbit or Google, “the 
Company shall pay . . . to Parent . . . an amount equal to $21,000,000 (such amount, the 
‘No Vote Fee’).” Google-Fitbit Merger Agreement, supra note 92, § 8.03(a)(ii), at 86–87 
(emphasis omitted). The presence of a large naked no vote fee, unlike an expense reim-
bursement provision, raises the specter of whether the target shareholders would be “co-
erced” to vote in favor of the merger, particularly when there is no competing buyer that 
is offering a more attractive consideration, and how large a naked no vote fee can be. This 
issue remains unresolved. In the case of In re Lear Corp. Shareholder Litigation, 967 A.2d 
640 (Del. Ch. 2008), the Delaware Court of Chancery had an opportunity to consider this 
provision. But relying in part on the factual findings that the target directors agreed to a 
naked no vote fee in return for a higher consideration (from $36 per share to $37.25 per 
share), and that the naked no vote fee of $25 million was only 0.9% of the total deal value, 
the Court determined that the target directors did not breach their fiduciary duties and 
the naked no vote fee did not constitute a corporate waste. See id. at 641, 648, 656–57. 
 102 In certain cases, the disappointed buyer is entitled to get both its expenses reim-
bursed and also collect a termination fee. The provisions from the ABA Model Merger 
Agreement are exemplary. For instance, § 7.1(e) allows the purchaser corporation to ter-
minate the agreement when the target board has changed its recommendation to its share-
holders. ABA MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 88, § 7.1(e), at 259. When the 
agreement has been terminated in accordance with § 7.1(e), § 7.3(a)(ii) allows the pur-
chaser corporation to recover its expenses and § 7.3(b)(i) allows the purchaser to collect 
the stipulated termination fee. Id. § 7.3(a)(ii), (b)(i), at 276. Sections 7.1(f) and 7.3(b)(ii) 
provide that the termination fee can also be triggered when the deal fails to close for other 
reasons, such as material inaccuracy in the target corporation’s representations and 
784 The University of Chicago Law Review [88:757 
 
Termination fees raise some difficult contract law issues as 
well, some of which have not been fully resolved. There is the 
question of whether a termination fee should be treated as liqui-
dated damages and, if yes, whether the antipenalty doctrine 
should allow the court to strike down some of the fees.103 Accord-
ing to the Second Restatement of Contracts, “[d]amages for 
breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement. . . .”104 
But, an important condition here is that the liquidated damages 
must be for breach of contract. If the contract expressly allows one 
party to terminate the contract and also collect a termination fee, 
it is not entirely clear whether a breach has occurred.105 A true 
breach happens presumably when one party does not abide by the 
terms of the agreement, for instance, when one party attempts to 
terminate a contract even in violation of the express terms of the 
contract. Since the primary goal of a merger agreement is to exe-
cute a merger, a termination fee could be thought of as setting up 
an alternative performance obligation for the target. 
The distinction here is important because if a termination fee 
is classified as liquidated damages, under the antipenalty rule 
(doctrine) of contract law, it cannot be unreasonably large when 
compared to the actual or anticipated loss (by the purchaser).106 
If, on the other hand, a termination fee is not liquidated damages, 
 
warranties, the target’s failure to satisfy other covenants, or the target corporation’s  
consummation of a competing transaction within a specified period of time after the ter-
mination (known as the “tail period”). See id. §§ 7.1(f), 7.3(b)(ii), at 259, 276. In sum, the 
goal of the termination fee is to allow the disappointed purchaser to collect a financial 
reward when the target consummates a transaction with a different buyer. 
 103 Another issue is whether a termination fee should be the exclusive remedy for the 
buyer. Acquisition agreements generally stipulate that, in case termination is triggered 
pursuant to the agreement, a termination fee is the exclusive remedy for the buyer. See, 
e.g., GPC-Essendant Merger Agreement, supra note 2, § 9.03(e), at 81 (“[I]n the event that 
the Termination Fee is paid in accordance with this Section 9.03, the payment of the Ter-
mination Fee shall be the sole and exclusive remedy of GPC.”). 
 104 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (AM. L. INST. 1979); see also 
U.C.C. §§ 2-718 to -719 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017). 
 105 This issue is heightened by the fact that not all terminations lead to collection of 
a termination fee. For instance, if the deal falls apart due to the parties’ failure to receive 
necessary regulatory approval, the purchaser is not likely to collect a termination fee from 
the target corporation. Termination fees are much more closely associated with the pres-
ence of a competing transaction and this increases the possibility that the parties may be 
using termination fee so as to deter a third-party bidder and also to extract more rent from 
a third party. 
 106 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (AM. L. INST. 1979) (“Damages for 
breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount that is 
reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and the diffi-
culties of proof of loss.”). 
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presumably no such restriction would apply. Also, unless other 
problems, such as conflicts of interest on the part of the directors 
and managers, are present, a termination fee would only be sub-
ject to a deferential business judgment review under corporate 
law. 
Notwithstanding this difficulty, the Brazen v. Bell Atlantic 
Corp. court treated a termination fee as liquidated damages and 
that holding still seems to control.107 Perhaps in response to the 
Brazen line of cases, oftentimes, the transacting parties will ex-
pressly stipulate in their agreement that the termination fee 
should (or can) be treated as liquidated damages and, more im-
portantly, the size of the termination fee is reasonable (i.e., it does 
not constitute a penalty). Here is an example from the Nexstar-
Tribune transaction. Section 9.3(c) of the agreement states: 
The Parties acknowledge that (i) the agreements contained 
in this Section 9.3 are an integral part of the transactions 
contemplated by this Agreement, (ii) the Company Termina-
tion Fee and Parent Expenses are not a penalty, but are liqui-
dated damages, in a reasonable amount that will compensate 
Parent in the circumstances in which such fee is payable for 
the efforts and resources expended and opportunities foregone 
while negotiating this Agreement and in reliance on this 
Agreement and on the expectation of the consummation of the 
transactions contemplated hereby, which amount would oth-
erwise be impossible to calculate with precision and (iii) that, 
without these agreements, the Parties would not enter into 
this Agreement.108 
What is interesting in the Nexstar-Tribune example is that, not 
only do the parties expressly state that the termination fee and 
 
 107 Brazen, 695 A.2d at 43. The court based its decision partly on the fact that the 
merger agreement itself (between NYNEX Corp. and Bell Atlantic Corp.) stated that the 
termination fee “constitute[s] liquidated damages and not a penalty.” Id. at 46 (emphasis 
omitted). According to the court, 
the express language in section 9.2(e) of the agreement unambiguously states 
that the termination fee provisions “constitute liquidated damages and not a 
penalty.”  
. . .  
[W]e find no compelling justification for treating the termination fee in this 
agreement as anything but a liquidated damages provision, in light of the ex-
press intent of the parties to have it so treated. 
Id. at 47–48. But deferring to the parties’ classification seems to invite possible opportunism. 
 108 Nexstar-Tribune Merger Agreement, supra note 91, § 9.3(c), at 79 (first emphasis 
in original). 
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the expenses constitute liquidated damages, but also that they 
are not a penalty.109 This raises an interesting question. Assum-
ing that the Brazen line of cases is correct in treating termination 
fees and expenses as liquidated damages, it is uncertain whether 
the courts will also honor the parties’ express stipulation that the 
fees and expenses are “reasonable” liquidated damages and there-
fore do not constitute a penalty.110 Furthermore, § 9.3(c) also 
 
 109 First and foremost, note that this language is quite similar to that used in the 
Brazen case. Brazen, 695 A.2d at 46. The agreement seems to treat these two concepts, 
liquidated damages and penalty, as being distinct, but this is likely incorrect. As mentioned 
earlier, the antipenalty doctrine would apply when a termination fee is treated as liqui-
dated damages. Hence, assuming that the courts will honor the parties’ designation of the 
termination fee (along with expense reimbursement) as liquidated damages, now they will 
be subject to the antipenalty doctrine. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) 
(AM. L. INST. 1979): 
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only 
at an amount that is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss 
caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss. A term fixing unreason-
ably large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a 
penalty. 
See also U.C.C. § 2-718 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017): 
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only 
at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm 
caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or 
nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing unrea-
sonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty. 
But see 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.18 (3d ed. 2004): 
If [a stipulated damages provision] is condemned as a penalty, it is unenforcea-
ble. But the rest of the agreement stands, and the injured party is remitted to 
the conventional damage remedy for breach of that agreement, just as if the pro-
vision had not been included. If the provision is sustained as one for liquidated 
damages, both parties are bound by it. 
 110 From the strategic perspective, stipulating that a termination fee constitutes liq-
uidated damages doesn’t seem to make a lot of sense, since, assuming that the court be-
comes more likely to honor that stipulation, the antipenalty doctrine would apply. It may 
make more sense from the parties’ perspective to call a termination fee provision an alterna-
tive performance provision. By doing so, they become more likely to bypass the antipenalty 
doctrine. The relevant provision in the Google-Fitbit agreement is somewhat cleaner in 
this regard. Section 8.03(a)(iii), in relevant part, states: 
[T]he Company Termination Fee shall constitute liquidated damages, and from 
and after such termination, Company shall have no further liability of any kind 
for any reason in connection with this Agreement or the termination contem-
plated hereby other than the payment of the Company Termination Fee . . . and 
such payments shall be the sole and exclusive remedy . . . against the Company 
. . . in the event of a termination of this Agreement giving rise to the payment of 
the Company Termination Fee. 
Google-Fitbit Merger Agreement, supra note 92, § 8.03(a)(iii), at 87 (emphasis added). 
While stating that the termination fee will be the sole and exclusive remedy for Google if 
the agreement is terminated pursuant to the agreement, if the deal falls apart due to other 
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states that the termination fee is necessary to compensate Nex-
star for the “efforts and resources expended and opportunities 
foregone” while it is negotiating the deal.111 Presumably, though, 
such reliance costs would be present even when the transaction 
falls apart for other reasons, such as when Tribune’s shareholders 
reject the deal without a competing buyer. As we saw earlier, how-
ever, in case that happens, Nexstar would be entitled to get only 
its expenses reimbursed, up to the cap of $15 million, only one-
ninth of the termination fee of $135 million.112 What justifies such 
drastically different fees? An important difference, of course, is 
that the much higher termination fee kicks in when a third-party 
buyer acquires the target.113 A termination fee, unlike a straight-
forward expense reimbursement provision, not only affects the 
buyer and the target but also the third party, and this contractual 
externality can have some interesting implications, as I examine 
in more detail in the next Part. 
B. Match Right 
When an initial buyer is given a match right, once there is an 
offer from a third party that is considered to be superior to the 
 
reasons, Google will reserve the right to pursue other remedies, including expectation 
damages or specific performance. See, e.g., id. § 9.09, at 92–93 (stating that in case the 
provisions of the agreement “were not performed in accordance with their specific terms 
or were otherwise breached,” the parties would be entitled to seek specific performance); 
see also ABA MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 88, § 7.2(b), at 273 (“[T]he termina-
tion of this Agreement shall not relieve any Party from any liability for fraud or any ma-
terial inaccuracy in or breach of any representation or any material breach of any warranty, 
covenant, or other provision contained in this Agreement.”). A termination fee, with or 
without the “sole and exclusive remedy” clause, presents a classic example in which the 
parties are anticipating possible ex post disputes when they are drafting their contract. 
See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 
YALE L.J. 814, 873–76 (2006); Albert H. Choi & George Triantis, Designing and Enforcing 
Preliminary Agreements, 98 TEX. L. REV. 439, 484–85 (2020). 
 111 Nexstar-Tribune Merger Agreement, supra note 91, § 9.3(c), at 79. 
 112 Id. In the Google-Fitbit transaction, by comparison, the termination fee was 
$80 million while the “no vote fee,” which is triggered if Fitbit shareholders reject the deal, 
was $21 million. So, the termination fee was about 4 times larger than the “no vote fee.” 
See Google-Fitbit Merger Agreement, supra note 92, § 8.03(a), at 86–87; see also supra 
notes 95, 101. 
 113 One important implication of that difference is that when the target is sold to a 
different buyer, the initial buyer no longer has an option to try to execute the deal again 
in the future. That is, unlike the deal simply falling apart (due, for instance, to the target 
shareholders’ rejection), the third party’s jumping the deal leads to the initial buyer’s loss 
of that option value. See supra note 15 (discussing the story of Dollar Thrifty Automotive 
Group). 
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buyer’s initial offer114 (subject to certain conditions), the right allows 
the buyer (and obligates the target) to negotiate in good faith and 
revise the buyer’s offer so that the third party’s offer is no longer 
superior. Similar to other covenants, such as a no-shop provision, 
a match right attempts to directly influence the target’s (or more 
precisely, target directors’ and managers’) behavior. 
The following provision, from the merger agreement between 
Nexstar Media and Tribune Media, is illustrative.115 In § 7.3, ti-
tled “No Solicitation by the Company,” a match right can be trig-
gered by the buyer, Nexstar Media (the “Parent”), before the di-
rectors of the target company, Tribune Media (the “Company”), 
can change its recommendation to their shareholders in response 
to, among other things, a more attractive offer coming from a 
third party. Subsection (f), in relevant part, states: 
Prior to making any Company Adverse Recommendation 
Change or entering into any Alternative Company 
 
 114 According to the ABA Model Merger Agreement, “Superior Proposal” is defined as 
an unsolicited, bona fide written offer made by a third party to acquire, directly 
or indirectly, by merger or otherwise, all of the outstanding shares of Company 
Common Stock or all or substantially all of the assets of the Company and its 
Subsidiaries, which the Company Board determines in its reasonable judgment, 
taking into account, among other things, all legal, financial, regulatory, and 
other aspects of the proposal and the person making the proposal and an opinion 
of an independent financial advisor of nationally recognized reputation (a) is 
more favorable from a financial point of view to the Company’s stockholders than 
the terms of the Merger, and (b) is reasonably capable of being consummated; 
provided, however, that any such offer shall not be deemed to be a “Superior 
Proposal” if any financing required to consummate the transaction contemplated 
by such offer is not committed and is not reasonably capable of being obtained 
by such third party. 
ABA MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 88, § 8.16, at 326 (last emphasis in original). 
Hence, “superiority” emphasizes the financial aspect for the target shareholders while condi-
tioning on the fact that the necessary financing is either obtained or likely obtained. See id. 
 115 On December 3, 2018, Nexstar Media Group and Tribune Media Company an-
nounced the merger, under which “Nexstar [would] acquire all outstanding shares of Trib-
une for $46.50 per share” (plus some extra in case there was a preclosing dividend). Exhibit 
99-1, supra note 99. The deal valued Tribune at about $4.1 billion and the consideration 
constituted about a 15.5% premium above Tribune’s closing price on November 30, 2018. 
See Benjamin Mullin & Joe Flint, Nexstar Reaches Deal to Buy Tribune Media for $4.1 Bil-
lion, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2018), https://perma.cc/266W-AT23; Exhibit 99-1, supra note 99. 
The merger was subject to the approval of the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) 
and Tribune’s shareholders. Tribune shareholders approved the deal on March 12, 2019. 
See generally Tribune Media Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 12, 2019). On Septem-
ber 13, 2019, the FCC approved the transaction. See Trib. Media Co., 34 FCC Rcd. 8436, 
8463 (2019). The merger closed on September 19, 2019. See generally Tribune Media Co., 
Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 19, 2019). No competing bidder emerged between the 
signing and the closing of the merger. 
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Acquisition Agreement, (i) the Company Board shall provide 
Parent at least four (4) Business Days’ prior written notice of 
its intention to take such action; . . . (ii) during the four (4) 
Business Days following such written notice, the Company 
Board and its Representatives shall negotiate in good faith 
with Parent . . . regarding any revisions to the terms of the 
transactions . . . in response to such Superior Company Pro-
posal. . . . After compliance with the foregoing sentence, the 
Company shall have no further obligations under the foregoing 
sentence, and . . . shall not be required to comply with such obli-
gations with respect to any other Superior Company Proposal.116 
In accordance with the provision, after an unsolicited, superior 
proposal (a “Superior Company Proposal”) has been made to the 
target by a third party, before Tribune Media’s board can change 
its recommendation regarding its deal with Nexstar Media to its 
shareholders (a “Company Adverse Recommendation Change”), 
among other things Tribune Media must, to the extent Nexstar 
Media desires, negotiate in good faith with Nexstar Media for four 
business days so as to make the third party’s offer no longer su-
perior. Furthermore, the last emphasized sentence makes it clear 
that Nexstar Media can require Tribune Media to negotiate in 
good faith only once: this is a limited match right. What is also 
interesting is that when Nexstar matches a third party’s offer, the 
agreement does not obligate Tribune to accept Nexstar’s revised 
offer. If the third party were to sweeten its offer in response to 
Nexstar’s revised offer, Nexstar would no longer be entitled to an 
exclusive match period. 
By comparison, here are the relevant sections from the mer-
ger agreement between Google (the “Parent”) and Fitbit (the 
“Company”).117 Under § 6.02, titled “Non-Solicitation; Acquisition 
 
 116 Nexstar-Tribune Merger Agreement, supra note 91, § 7.3(f), at 65 (emphasis 
added). According to the merger agreement, “Superior Company Proposal” is defined as “a 
Company Acquisition Proposal from any Person . . . which the Company Board determines 
in good faith . . . to be more favorable, from a financial point of view, to the stockholders 
of the Company than the transactions contemplated by this Agreement.” Id. § 1.1, at 12. 
“Company Acquisition Proposal,” in turn, is defined as a proposal to acquire either 15% or 
more of the company’s assets or business, or as when the company’s shareholders “hold 
less than 85% of the equity interests or voting power” of the surviving corporation. Id. 
§ 1.1, at 2–3. 
 117 On November 1, 2019, Fitbit, Inc., and Google LLC (a subsidiary of Alphabet, Inc.) 
announced that Google would acquire all of the outstanding stock of Fitbit at $7.35 in cash 
per share. Similar to the Tribune-Nexstar transaction, the Google-Fitbit deal was also 
structured as a reverse triangular transaction, where Magnoliophyta, Inc., a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Google, created for the sole purpose of the merger, was to merge into Fitbit, 
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Proposals,” Fitbit’s board, in response to a more attractive third-
party offer (“Superior Proposal”), cannot change its recommenda-
tion (on the merger with Google) to its shareholders and also ter-
minate the agreement: 
(i) . . . [T]he Company shall not be entitled to terminate this 
Agreement . . . unless:  
(A) the Company shall have provided to Parent four (4) 
Business Days’ prior written notice . . . advising Parent 
that the Company intends to take such action; . . . and  
(B) [ ] during such four (4) Business Day period . . . the 
Company shall have engaged in good faith negotiations 
with Parent . . . regarding changes to the terms of this 
Agreement intended to cause such Acquisition Proposal 
to no longer constitute a Superior Proposal. . . . 
(ii) . . . any [ ] revisions to the financial terms or any other 
material terms of a Superior Proposal . . . shall constitute a 
new Acquisition Proposal and shall in each case require the 
Company to deliver to Parent a new [notice] and a new two (2) 
Business Day period shall commence thereafter.118 
Similar to the Nexstar-Tribune agreement, after an unsolicited, 
superior proposal has been made to Fitbit by a third party, before 
the Fitbit board can change its recommendation (regarding the 
existing deal) to its shareholders, the Fitbit board must (among 
other things) negotiate “in good faith” with Google for four busi-
ness days so as to make the third party’s offer no longer superior. 
 
with Fitbit as the surviving corporation. See Fitbit, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 
1, 2019). The merger consideration was about 19% above the latest Fitbit closing price. 
See Rob Copeland & Patrick Thomas, Google to Buy Fitbit, Amping Up Wearables Race, 
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 1, 2019), https://perma.cc/ZX2M-24DZ. On January 3, 2020, Fitbit share-
holders held a virtual special shareholders meeting (via exclusive live webcast) and ap-
proved the merger. See Fitbit, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Jan. 6, 2020). Between the 
signing of the agreement and the shareholder approval, no competing buyer emerged. 
 118 Google-Fitbit Merger Agreement, supra note 92, § 6.02(e), at 66–67 (emphasis 
added). According to the agreement, “Superior Proposal” is defined as 
a bona fide written Acquisition Proposal . . . made by a Third Party that the 
Company Board determines in good faith, after consultation with the Company’s 
outside independent financial advisors and outside legal counsel, and consider-
ing all the terms of the Acquisition Proposal (including the legal, financial, fi-
nancing and regulatory aspects of such proposal, the identity of the Third Party 
making such proposal, the conditions for completion of such proposal, and the 
timing and likelihood of consummation), to be more favorable to the holders of 
Company Common Stock from a financial point of view than the Merger. 
Id. § 1.01, at 12–13. 
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Unlike the match right in the Nexstar-Tribune agreement, when 
a third party revises its offer, a new, two-business-day require-
ment gets triggered, and there is no restriction on how many 
times the match right will be triggered. This is an example of an 
unlimited match right.119 
A match right presents interesting contract and corporate 
law questions of what additional obligations it actually imposes 
on the target (or what additional right it gives to the buyer). This 
issue can be examined in (at least) three different scenarios. First, 
even without an express match right with an express good faith 
obligation, the buyer can presumably always ask the target to 
modify the agreement in response to a third party’s superior offer. 
Second, with a limited match right, when the inside buyer tries 
to sweeten its offer in response to a third party’s offer after its 
match right has run out, the target is not prohibited from negoti-
ating with the inside buyer. Third, when a third party makes a 
superior offer for the target either initially or after the initial 
buyer matches the third party’s offer, the target is not prohibited 
from negotiating with the third party. 
With respect to the first two issues, at least under contract 
law’s default obligations, as far as the modification of an existing 
agreement is concerned, both the target and the buyer have an 
obligation to renegotiate in good faith.120 If the target were to 
 
 119 The match right in the ABA Model Merger Agreement is also unlimited but more 
favorable for the acquirer. See ABA MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 93, § 4.6(c), 
at 170–71. Notably, not only is the match right unlimited, whenever a competing offer gets 
revised, the buyer gets the same five-business-day period to negotiate with the target. Id. 
On occasion, the parties will also stipulate that the target has an obligation to negotiate 
with the buyer on an exclusive basis. See Subramanian & Zhao, supra note 31, at 1236. 
 120 According to the Second Restatement, “[e]very contract imposes upon each party 
a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.” 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. L. INST. 1979). More specifically with 
respect to modification, the Restatement states: “A promise modifying a duty under a con-
tract not fully performed on either side is binding if the modification is fair and equitable 
in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract was made. . . .” 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89(a) (AM. L. INST. 1979). The Uniform Commer-
cial Code (UCC) is more explicit with the duty to modify in good faith. While the UCC 
states that “[a]n agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no consideration 
to be binding,” the official comment states that “modifications made [under § 2-209(1)] 
must meet the test of good faith imposed by this Act.” U.C.C. § 2-209(1) & cmt. 2 (AM. L. 
INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017). Although the contours of the good faith duty are not very 
clear, under the UCC, it embodies at least two elements: (1) subjective honesty (i.e., the 
parties must be honest with each other); and (2) commercial fair dealing (i.e., they must 
deal fairly with each other). U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017); 
see also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agree-
ments, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661, 675 (2007) (explaining that modern courts hold parties to a 
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simply refuse to renegotiate with the initial buyer who has no ex-
press match right or whose match right has run out, such a be-
havior may constitute a breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing under contract law.121 Under corporate law, 
such a behavior can also constitute a breach of the target direc-
tors’ fiduciary duties.122 With respect to third-party buyers, given 
that the target may not be in any contractual relationship with 
them, the target presumably does not have a contract-law-based 
obligation to negotiate with them (in good faith).123 On the other 
hand, again, under corporate law, refusing to negotiate with a 
 
commitment to negotiate in good faith once they have made a preliminary agreement); 
Cathy Hwang, Deal Momentum, 65 UCLA L. REV. 376, 394–97 (2018) (examining why deal 
lawyers say courts rarely enforce breaches of preliminary agreements); Choi & Triantis, 
supra note 110, at 446–47 (analyzing the good faith duty in the context of modifying non-
binding preliminary agreements). 
 121 Whether contract law imposes an affirmative obligation to not refuse to renegotiate 
is not entirely clear. For instance, according to comment 2 to U.C.C. § 2-209, 
modifications made thereunder must meet the test of good faith imposed by this 
Act. The effective use of bad faith to escape performance on the original contract 
terms is barred, and the extortions of a “modification” without legitimate com-
mercial reason is ineffective as a violation of the duty of good faith. 
U.C.C. § 2-209, cmt. 2 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) (emphasis added). The UCC, 
therefore, seems to contemplate that, to the extent that a modification has been made, it 
must satisfy the good faith and fair dealing obligation. According to Professor Allan Farns-
worth, on the other hand, the UCC’s good faith obligation 
gives the victim the right to recover damages if the other party’s breach of the 
duty of good faith resulted in a failure to arrive at a modification. Damages 
should ordinarily be based on the victim’s reliance losses, as in the analogous 
case of precontractual liability for breach of an agreement to negotiate in good 
faith. 
FARNSWORTH, supra note 109, § 4.22 (emphasis in original). But see Choi & Triantis, supra 
note 110, at 455 & n.54 (showing that courts, even in New York and Delaware, have been 
willing to grant expectation damages for breach of duty to negotiate in good faith). Assum-
ing that the courts would be hesitant in granting expectation damages or other remedies, 
such as specific performance, by expressly obligating the target to negotiate in good faith 
(and also stipulating the remedy), the agreement seems to make it substantially easier for 
the disappointed buyer to recover expectation damages or other remedies and not just 
reliance damages. 
 122 Target directors’ corporate law obligations will depend on whether the transaction 
is in “Revlon mode.” If it is, the directors will likely have to engage with any buyer (either 
initial or outside) that makes a superior proposal. A limited match right, in that setting, 
may not have as much a bite against the initial buyer. 
 123 If, for instance, the target has entered into a confidentiality agreement with the 
third party, while negotiating with the third party so as to allow (assist) the third party 
to make a superior offer may not constitute a “modification” of an existing contract, the 
existence of a confidentiality agreement may impose some contract-based duties on the 
target and the third party. For more in-depth analyses on the precontractual duty to ne-
gotiate in good faith, see supra note 120. 
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third party who makes a superior offer can constitute a breach of 
the target directors’ fiduciary duties. 
What a match right seems to do, then, is to prevent the target 
from accepting a third party’s offer without giving the initial 
buyer a reasonable chance to compete. It also lays out a specific 
time period (e.g., four business days in both the Nexstar-Tribune 
and Google-Fitbit transactions) during which the buyer is granted 
the right to (exclusively) negotiate with the target. Once the ne-
gotiation period is over, assuming that all the other conditions 
have been satisfied, the target is free to either change its recom-
mendation to its shareholders or even terminate the agreement, 
presumably without having to worry about whether such behav-
ior constitutes acting in bad faith under contract law or breaching 
fiduciary duties under corporate law. With a limited match right, 
as in the Nexstar-Tribune transaction, after the initial buyer has 
exhausted its match right, under contract law the target is much 
more free to accept a third party’s offer without having to engage 
the initial buyer: Tribune “shall not be required to comply with 
[good faith negotiation] obligations with respect to any other Su-
perior Company Proposal.”124 If Tribune refused to negotiate further 
with Nexstar after Nexstar’s match right ran out, it would be dif-
ficult to argue that Tribune’s behavior constituted a breach of the 
implied duty to modify (or negotiate) in good faith under contract 
law.125 
A match right, in short, seeks to lay out some procedural safe-
guards that both the buyer and the target can rely on in making 
sure that the target will come to the negotiating table and can 
walk away once the obligation has been satisfied. While the de-
fault rules under contract law impose somewhat uncertain and 
open-ended obligations (e.g., the implied duty of good faith and 
fair dealing) on the contracting parties with respect to contract 
modification, a match right provides a more express guarantee 
(and a clearer guideline) to the initial buyer and the target that 
the initial buyer will be given the opportunity to meet the third 
party’s offer and preserve the deal. Moreover, the target can 
switch sides once the specified opportunity has been satisfied 
with the initial buyer. Assuming that the target’s legal obliga-
tions toward the third parties remain relatively stable through 
 
 124 Nexstar-Tribune Merger Agreement, supra note 91, § 7.3(f), at 65. 
 125 While Nexstar may no longer have a strong contract claim against Tribune, it 
would be interesting to know whether such a behavior would lead to breach of Tribune’s 
directors’ fiduciary duties. 
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the competition and negotiation process, a limited or unlimited 
match right at least tilts the bargaining leverage toward or 
against the initial buyer. 
III.  THE EFFECT OF DEAL PROTECTION DEVICES 
Having examined a brief history of deal protection devices in 
practice, in this Part, I examine the impact of deal protection de-
vices with the help of auction theory. As a preliminary observa-
tion, when an acquisition agreement is subject to a termination 
fee or a match right, it is not surprising that it becomes more dif-
ficult for a third-party buyer to enter the fray and successfully 
snatch the target away from the initial buyer. For instance, with 
a match right, even after a third-party buyer makes a superior 
offer to the target, within a contractually stipulated period of 
time, the initial buyer can require the target to negotiate in good 
faith, match the third party’s offer, and render the third party’s 
offer no longer attractive. A match right can potentially create an 
uneven auction format, where the initial buyer gets to observe the 
third party’s offer before deciding whether to match the offer. 
However, as we will see shortly, whether a match right in fact 
creates an uneven playing field and whether either party will ac-
tually have an advantage depends significantly on whether the 
match right is limited or unlimited. 
The story with a target termination fee is, by comparison, 
somewhat more straightforward. When a target has an obligation 
to pay a termination fee, this can substantially decrease the tar-
get board’s incentive to accept a third party’s offer. As a simple 
example, if the initial deal price is $110 million but the agreement 
has a $10 million termination fee provision, for the target board 
to seriously consider a third party’s offer, the offer has to be at 
least $120 million (and not simply $110 million). If a third party’s 
willingness to pay for the target falls between $110 and $120 million, 
in the presence of a $10 million termination fee, the third party 
will decline to enter the competition, even though it is possible 
that the third party values the target more than the initial buyer 
(e.g., when the initial buyer values the target at $115 million 
while the third party buyer values the target at $118 million). In 
addition, being able to collect a sizable termination fee reduces 
the initial buyer’s incentive to compete against a third party. If, 
for instance, the initial buyer values the target at $120 million 
but can collect $5 million in termination fees, the maximum the 
initial buyer would be willing to pay for the target is $115 million 
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(and not $120 million). With decreased competitiveness from the 
initial buyer, there is less vigorous competition when a competing 
buyer emerges, which, in turn, leads to a lower return for the target. 
What is somewhat counterintuitive is the fact that such deal 
protection provisions can enhance both the initial buyer’s and the 
target’s expected joint return.126 An important point to recognize here 
is that the deal protection provisions not only affect the affairs 
between two contracting entities—the initial buyer and the target—
but also affect the third party. Deal protection provisions are a 
classic example of how a contract can generate an externality (a 
contractual externality) for a third party.127 Furthermore, even 
though a third party may be harmed by the deal protection devices, 
the contracting parties can jointly benefit from them, which, in 
turn, creates an opportunity for the target board to increase the 
return for its shareholders. Finally, notwithstanding the possibil-
ity of increasing the return for the target shareholders, a deal pro-
tection mechanism can reduce efficiency by allocating the target 
corporation’s assets to a buyer with lower valuation.128 While a 
deal protection device harms the third party and reduces effi-
ciency, it can increase the expected returns for the contracting 
parties. This point can be most easily seen with a few simple, nu-
merical examples of a match right and a termination fee. 
A. Target Termination Fee 
Suppose there is a target corporation (S) with a valuation of 
$100 million (target’s stand-alone value). The target negotiates 
with an initial buyer (B1), who values the target at $120 million, 
for a possible sale. In this case, the target and the initial buyer 
will execute an agreement at a price of P between $100 and 
$120 million. For simplicity, suppose they agree on a deal price of 
$110 million (P = $110 million). After entering into the agree-
ment, suppose that there is a 50% chance that a new buyer will 
 
 126 This is true even when we assume that deal protection devices are not necessary 
in inducing the initial buyer to investigate and make an offer for the target corporation. 
 127 See supra note 37. 
 128 An important assumption underlying this inefficiency result is that there is some 
impediment to efficient (ex post) bargaining or renegotiation, such as asymmetric infor-
mation. When a new buyer with a higher reservation value emerges and when all three 
parties are fully informed of the respective valuations, rather than preventing the new 
buyer from purchasing the target corporation, they can renegotiate the contract to take 
down the deal protection devices and let the new buyer purchase the target corporation. 
However, if the target and the initial buyer are unaware of the new buyer’s valuation, as 
is assumed in our examples throughout, such a renegotiation will no longer be feasible. 
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appear.129 With the other 50% probability, no new buyer appears. 
While the new buyer’s valuation is at least $110 million, for ease 
of analysis, let’s assume that there is a 20% chance that B2, which 
values the target at $115 million, appears, and with the other 
30% chance, B3, which is willing to pay up to $130 million for the 
target, appears. Throughout, we will assume that the target’s 
stand-alone value and the terms of the initial agreement are 
known to all players (based, for instance, on the target’s publicly 
observed market capitalization and the public filing of the agree-
ment), but that a buyer’s reservation value is known only to that 
player.130 For simplicity, though, we assume that B1 knows that 
the outside buyer’s valuation is either $115 or $130 million with 
respective probabilities: that is, the inside buyer knows the dis-
tribution of the outside buyer’s valuation.131 
1. The case with no termination fee. 
Suppose there is no termination fee. With the initial deal 
price of $110 million, for the new buyer (either B2 or B3) to suc-
cessfully break up the deal, the new buyer will have to offer at 
 
 129 Throughout the examples, we are assuming that the probability that a third-party 
buyer appears to compete against the initial buyer is fixed. This assumption is made to 
simplify the analysis. One obvious contractual choice that can potentially affect the prob-
ability that a competing bidder emerges is whether the agreement has either a no-shop or 
a go-shop clause. With a go-shop clause (under which the target actively solicits third-
party offers), one can imagine that the chance that a competing bidder emerges on the 
scene is higher. Especially when such a clause will tilt the probability of a high-valuation 
buyer (B3) emerging, the contracting parties have an even stronger incentive to adopt a 
large termination fee so as to increase their joint profit. 
 130 Two points need to be made regarding the assumptions. First, given that the out-
side buyers get to observe the deal price of $110 million, the outside buyers may be able 
to reverse engineer and find out that the inside buyer’s reservation value is $120 million, 
or at least get more information about it. The substantive analysis on termination fees 
will remain the same, however. If the outside buyers observe that the inside buyer’s valu-
ation is $120 million, with no termination fee, B2 will simply decline to compete against 
B1, whereas B3 will submit a competing bid of (slightly more than) $120 million and ac-
quire the target, rather than going through an ascending-bid auction process. Second, and 
more generally, we are assuming that, while the buyers (and the target) do not observe 
other buyers’ valuations, they know their own while their valuations may be correlated. 
This assumption sets up a private value auction. For a more detailed discussion, see infra 
Part III.D. 
 131 More specifically, we assume that this outside buyer’s valuation and the probabil-
ities are common knowledge. That is, all the players in the model know that the outside 
buyer’s valuation will be either $115 or $130 million and their attendant probabilities. 
This assumption will substantially simplify the analysis without taking away the main 
thesis. Otherwise, we will have to start with a more general (possibly continuous) distri-
bution. The assumption also gives the inside buyer an informational advantage against 
the outside buyer. 
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least $110 million to the seller. Furthermore, given that the ini-
tial buyer (B1) is willing to pay up to $120 million for the target, 
we can imagine that, upon the entry of a new buyer, a bidding 
competition between the buyers (either between B1 and B2 or be-
tween B1 and B3) will ensue. While there are many different ways 
one can model the competition, the simplest and the most tracta-
ble way to think about this is to imagine that the buyers engage 
in an ascending-bid English auction in which the initial bid starts 
at $110 million. That is, the initial (commonly observed) price 
starts at $110 million and keeps rising until only one bidder re-
mains in the competition and the last remaining bidder becomes 
the winner who pays the last observed price to the target. 
When B2 (with a reservation value of $115 million) enters the 
fray, for instance, the bidding competition between B1 and B2 will 
result in B1 acquiring the target corporation at a price of (slightly 
more than) $115 million. To see this, when the commonly ob-
served bid starts at $110 million, each buyer is willing to stay in 
the auction until the bid reaches its reservation value. Given that 
the initial buyer (B1) is willing to pay up to $120 million for the 
target while the competing buyer (B2) is willing to pay only up to 
$115 million, when the bid reaches $115 million, B2 drops out of 
the auction, the (commonly observed) price stops, and B1 is de-
clared the winner. Using the same logic, when B3 (with a reser-
vation value of $130 million) appears, B3 will be able to win the 
auction and acquire the target at (slightly more than) $120 million. 
What is the implication of the competition? First, from the 
perspective of the target (S), there are three possible scenarios: 
(1) a 50% chance no new buyer appears, and S is sold to B1 at 
$110 million; (2) a 20% chance B2 emerges and competes, and S 
is to sold to B1 at $115 million; and (3) a 30% chance B3 enters 
and competes and wins against B1, and B3 acquires S at 
$120 million. When we combine these three possibilities, the tar-
get’s expected net profit is $14 million.132 For B1, its expected 
profit is $6 million.133 For B2 and B3, conditional on their entering 
the competition, their profits are $0 and $10 million (= $130 million 
– $120 million), respectively. Finally, whenever a new buyer  
appears on the scene, the target is sold to the buyer with the 
higher valuation: allocative efficiency is achieved. The results are 
summarized in the second column in Table 1. 
 
 132 0.5 * ($110 million – $100 million) + 0.2 * ($115 million – $100 million) = $14 million. 
 133 0.5 * ($120 million – $110 million) + 0.2 * ($115 million – $110 million) = $6 million. 
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2. The case with a termination fee. 
Now suppose the target (S) and the initial buyer (B1) set the 
initial purchase price at $110 million but with a termination fee 
of $4 million: (P,T) = ($110 million,$4 million). The termination 
fee is about 3.6% of the deal price. With the purchase price of 
$110 million and the termination fee of $4 million, the minimum 
the outside buyer (B2 or B3) will have to bid is now $114 million 
(= $110 million + $4 million). At the same time, B1 can underbid 
B2 or B3 by (slightly less than) $4 million and B1’s bid will still 
be more attractive to S. The competition becomes uneven (the 
auction becomes “asymmetric”) and the termination fee forces the 
outside buyer to make the initial bid higher than the deal price at 
least by the size of the termination fee: it forces the outside buyer 
to make a “jump bid.” 
Notwithstanding the uneven competition, so long as the size 
of the termination fee is relatively small, competition will ensure 
that the target will be sold to the buyer that values the target 
more. The uneven playing field, however, will redistribute the 
profit from the target to the initial buyer. When B2 enters the 
competition by bidding (slightly more than) $114 million, B1 will still 
be able to acquire the target at (slightly more than) $111 million. 
When B3 enters the competition, on the other hand, B3 will win 
at a price of (slightly more than) $120 million. Compared to the 
case with no termination fee, the expected profit for S goes down 
to $12 million.134 At the same time, the expected profit for B1  
increases to $8 million.135 The expected profits for B2 and B3 stay 
the same as before. In short, allocative efficiency is preserved, but 
the distribution of the pie shifts in favor of the initial buyer (B1) 
against the target (S). 
In fact, it is easy to show that as the target termination fee 
rises and the initial deal price stays constant, the target’s ex-
pected return goes down while the inside buyer’s expected return 
improves. So long as the size of the termination fee is equal to or 
less than the expected return from closing the deal for the initial 
buyer (in our case, $10 million), we can ensure allocative effi-
ciency: the outside buyer will be able to acquire the target only 
when it values the target more than the inside buyer. A larger 
 
 134 0.5 * ($110 million – $100 million) + 0.2 * ($111 million – $100 million) + 0.3 * 
($120 million – $100 million – $4 million) = $12 million. 
 135 0.5 * ($120 million – $110 million) + 0.2 * ($120 million – $111 million) + 0.3 * 
$4 million = $8 million. 
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termination fee creates a purely distributional effect. It simply 
shifts the return from the seller to the inside buyer. When the size 
of the termination fee is larger than the inside buyer’s expected 
return from closing the deal (under the initial terms), on the other 
hand, allocative efficiency is no longer guaranteed. In addition, 
the target and the inside buyer can actually increase their ex-
pected joint return. 
To see this, suppose, for instance, the target and the inside 
buyer agree to a deal price of $116 million and a termination fee 
of $8 million, which is about 6.9% of the deal price. Now, for an 
outside buyer to compete against the inside buyer, it will have to 
bid at least $124 million. This means that an outside buyer, like 
B2, who values the target at $115 million, would simply decline 
to enter the competition. Even if B2’s valuation were $123 million, 
B2 would still decline to compete, even though it values the target 
more than the inside buyer. A sizable termination fee (along with 
the deal price) is generating an allocative inefficiency. At the 
same time, for B1, given that closing the deal under the initial 
terms produces an expected profit of (only) $4 million, whenever 
a third party makes a bid of (slightly higher than) $124 million, 
it is in B1’s interest to not compete and simply collect the termina-
tion fee of $8 million. That is, if B3 were to emerge and bid 
(slightly higher than) $124 million, B1 will decline to compete, 
and B3 will acquire the target at $124 million. The expected profit 
for the target, then, becomes $16 million.136 The expected profit 
for B1 is $5.2 million.137 The expected profits for B2 and B3 are, 
respectively, $0 and $6 million. The results are tabulated in the 
fourth column of Table 1. 
3. A comparison. 
When we compare these scenarios, a few salient observations 
bubble up. Foremost, when the initial price remains unchanged at 
$110 million, with a $4 million termination fee, compared to the case 
with no termination fee, the target’s expected return is strictly lower 
while the inside buyer’s (B1’s) expected return is strictly higher. 
These results are not surprising: with a $4 million termination 
fee, B1 can afford to be much less aggressive in competing against 
an outside buyer and can still win the competition. When B2 
 
 136 0.7 * ($116 million – $100 million) + 0.3 * ($124 million – $100 million – $8 million) 
= $16 million. 
 137 0.7 * ($120 million – $116 million) + 0.3 * $8 million = $5.2 million. 
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emerged, B1 was able to acquire the target at $111 million, instead 
of at $115 million. This implies that agreeing to pay a termination 
fee to the initial buyer is a costly enterprise from the target’s per-
spective. More generally, holding the deal price the same, as the 
termination fee gets larger, the target’s return gets smaller while 
the initial buyer’s expected return gets larger.138 At the same 
time, so long as the termination fee is smaller than B1’s expected 
return from closing the deal under the initial terms ($10 million 
in the numerical example), the joint profit of the target and B1 
stay the same and there is no allocative inefficiency. 





(P,T) = ($110,$0) 
With  
Termination 
Fee and Same 
Price 





(P,T) = ($116,$8) 
Target (S)  
Expected Profit 
(Res. Value = $100) 
$14 million $12 million $16 million 
Initial Buyer (B1)  
Expected Profit 
(Res. Value = $120) 
$6 million $8 million $5.2 million 
Target and Initial 
Buyer Joint Profit 
$20 million $20 million $21.2 million 
New Buyer (B2) Profit 
(Res. Value = $115) 
$0 $0 $0 
New Buyer (B3) Profit 
(Res. Value = $130) 
$10 million $10 million $6 million 
Possible Inefficient  
Sale of Target? 
No No Yes 
 
When the termination fee is larger than B1’s expected return 
under the initial terms, by comparison, not only will the joint 
profit of the target and B1 increase, but there is also the danger 
of allocative inefficiency. This was seen in the example in which 
the deal price was $116 million and the termination fee was 
$8 million. Compared to the case with no or a moderate ($4 million) 
termination fee, the joint profit of the target and the inside buyer 
is strictly higher: $21.2 million versus $20 million. The additional 
 
 138 Conditional on deal price, therefore, as the target’s bargaining leverage increases, 
the target would prefer to set a lower termination fee. See Badawi & de Fontenay, supra 
note 54, at 1149–51. 
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joint return comes from the fact that the duo extracts a higher bid 
from the high valuation outside buyer (B3). Since B3 enters the 
scene with 30% probability and B3 wins the competition with a 
$4 million higher payment, this translates to an expected increase 
of $1.2 million (= 0.3 * $4 million). A large termination fee also 
creates a possible allocative inefficiency. If an outside buyer’s val-
uation is higher than $120 million but below $124 million, for  
instance, even though the outside buyer values the target more 
than B1, it will simply decline to compete against B1. In short, a 
large termination fee will allow the target and the inside buyer to 
realize a higher expected return while potentially prohibiting an 
outside buyer who values the target more than the inside buyer 
from acquiring the target. 
B. Match Right 
As we saw earlier, when an inside buyer is given the right to 
match an outside buyer’s offer, the target, after receiving a supe-
rior proposal from an outside buyer, must allow the inside buyer 
to match the outside buyer’s offer (i.e., negotiate in good faith with 
the inside buyer) so as to make the outside buyer’s offer no longer 
superior. Given that a match right allows the existing buyer to 
match a new bidder’s offer and consummate the transaction, at 
least in theory, it is similar to another commonly observed con-
tractual mechanism, the right of first refusal.139 Simply stated, 
when the target corporation grants a right of first refusal to the 
initial buyer, whenever an outside buyer emerges and makes an 
offer to acquire the target, the right holder (the initial buyer) can 
simply match the outside buyer’s offer and acquire the target. 
With a properly structured right of first refusal, both the target 
corporation (grantor of the right) and the initial buyer (the right 
holder) can increase their expected joint returns at the expense of 
the new buyer.140 
 
 139 For a more detailed, auction-theory-based analysis, see generally Albert H. Choi, 
A Rent Extraction Theory of Right of First Refusal, 57 J. INDUS. ECON. 252 (2009); see also 
Restrepo & Subramanian, supra note 31, at 1061 n.213 (comparing a match right to a 
right of first refusal); Quinn, supra note 31, at 1027 & n.95 (same). 
 140 When a right of first refusal is in place, the right holder can basically engage in 
“cream-skimming”: declining to exercise the right (i.e., not matching a third party’s offer) 
only when a third party’s offer is higher than the right holder’s valuation for the property. 
When a third party acquires the property, then, the joint (gross) return for the right-holder 
and the property owner is higher than the right holder’s valuation. By contrast, without a 
right, the joint profit will be equal to the right holder’s valuation. See Choi, supra note 
139, at 254. 
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1. A comparison to a right of first refusal. 
A right of first refusal functions as a dynamic reserve price in 
auctions, where the reserve price (the minimum price that starts 
the auction process) is determined ex post by the outside buyer’s 
bid.141 The reason a right of first refusal can increase the joint 
profit of the target and the initial buyer is fairly straightforward. 
With a right of first refusal in place, the initial buyer will decline 
to match the outside buyer’s offer only when the outside buyer 
offers more than the initial buyer’s reservation value ($120 million 
in our example). Hence, when the initial buyer exercises the right 
of first refusal and wins the competition, the joint gross return 
(for the target and the initial buyer) will be $120 million. On the 
other hand, when the initial buyer does not exercise the right of 
first refusal, the joint gross return will be higher than $120 million. 
By contrast, had an evenhanded auction process (such as an Eng-
lish auction) been held, whether or not the inside buyer wins the 
contest, the joint gross return for the target and the inside buyer 
would be $120 million: (1) in case the inside buyer wins, they re-
alize a gross return of $120 million; (2) but if the outside buyer 
wins, the outside buyer pays the inside buyer’s valuation of 
$120 million.142 In short, a right of first refusal, much like a ter-
mination fee, can function as a surplus extraction mechanism 
against outside buyers. 
While it may be tempting to equate a match right used in a 
mergers and acquisitions setting to a right of first refusal—espe-
cially since, under both mechanisms, the inside buyer is given the 
right to match an outside buyer’s offer—there are some important 
differences. Under a conventional right of first refusal, once the 
inside buyer matches an outside buyer’s bid, the competition ends 
and the inside buyer acquires the target. With a match right, how-
ever, the inside buyer’s matching of an outside buyer’s bid does 
not end the competition. The outside buyer, after observing the 
inside buyer’s matching bid, is free to come back with another, 
more attractive offer for the target.143 In fact, while the inside 
 
 141 The reserve price is the minimum price that the bidders must submit to be able to 
participate in the auction process. With the right of first refusal, the right holder’s reser-
vation value functions as a reserve price. 
 142 If an English (or second price) auction is not being used, the gross return for the 
target and the inside buyer may be lower than the inside buyer’s valuation when an out-
side buyer wins the auction. 
 143 This is subject to the caveat that the target does not have an obligation to negotiate 
in good faith with a third-party buyer, with whom the target does not have a contractual 
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buyer may be contractually limited in how many times it may be 
able to exercise the right, there is no formal constraint on how 
many times the outside buyer may be able to come back with a 
revised offer for the target. Furthermore, even if the inside buyer 
were to match an outside buyer’s offer, unlike the conventional 
right of first refusal, the match right does not obligate the target 
to accept the inside buyer’s matching offer. The target can take 
the matching offer and negotiate with the outside buyer to entice 
the outside buyer to sweeten its offer. In short, a match right used 
in a mergers and acquisitions setting, in some sense, turns the 
conventional right of first refusal on its head.144 A limited match 
right, in particular, constrains the inside buyer’s behavior for the 
benefit of the outside buyer. 
2. Limited match right. 
To be able to more concretely examine the impact of a match 
right, let’s examine a simple numerical example. Just as in the 
previous example, let’s assume that the target’s reservation value 
is $100 million, the initial buyer’s reservation value is $120 million, 
and the parties agree on the initial deal price of $110 million. 
Also, after the initial agreement has been entered into, there is a 
chance that a new buyer will appear who will attempt to jump the 
deal and purchase the target. Just as before, we will assume that 
there is a 50% chance that a new buyer does not appear, with a 
20% chance that a new buyer with a valuation of $115 million 
(B2) will appear, and with a remaining 30% chance that the new 
buyer’s (B3’s) valuation is $130 million. As before, we continue to 
assume that the buyers do not observe the others’ valuations,145 
 
relationship. See supra Part II.B. Of course, the target directors may have a fiduciary  
obligation to engage with the third party when the third party’s revised offer is more  
attractive than the initial buyer’s matched offer. 
 144 There are also a few other differences between a conventional right of first refusal 
and a match in a mergers and acquisitions context. First, in a mergers and acquisitions 
context, the initial buyer has already agreed to purchase the target corporation at an 
agreed-upon price. By contrast, in a conventional right of first refusal setting, no such 
price has been determined between the property owner and the right holder. Second, in a 
conventional right of first refusal setting, though not always, there often is a preexisting 
relationship between the property owner and the right holder. The most common case is 
that between an owner-landlord and tenant. See Choi, supra note 139, at 252–54, 256. 
 145 We are assuming that the inside buyer knows that the outside buyer’s reservation 
values will be either $115 or $130 million, while the outside buyer only knows the distri-
bution of the inside buyer’s reservation value. If we assume that, based on the deal price 
of $110 million, the outside buyers can infer the inside buyer’s valuation of $120 million 
while the substantive analysis will remain the same, in the case with an unlimited match 
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but B1 knows that the outside buyer’s valuation is either $115 or 
$130 million, with respective probabilities. 
Now, suppose that the initial agreement contains a match 
right. To focus on the match right, let’s assume that there is no 
termination fee. We will discuss later the implication of having 
both. The match right can be of two types: limited (M < ∞) or un-
limited (M = ∞). If the match right is unlimited, there is no limi-
tation on how many times the initial buyer can match the new 
buyer’s offer. If the match right is limited, on the other hand, the 
number of times that the initial buyer can exercise the right will 
be capped in the agreement. Although, in theory, this cap can be 
any number, to make the analysis simple, we will focus on the 
case where the initial buyer can exercise the match right only 
once: the cap is set at 1 (M = 1).146 In sum, when the match right 
is unlimited, the initial buyer (the right holder) can exercise the 
right as many times as it desires; whereas if the match right is 
limited, the initial buyer can exercise it only once. We will see 
later that as the cap rises, a limited match right will become more 
like an unlimited match right. 
Suppose the initial buyer has a limited match right, subject 
to which the initial buyer can match the new buyer’s offer only 
once (M = 1). If, after matching the new buyer’s initial bid, the 
outside buyer offers a more (financially) attractive offer as its sec-
ond bid, the initial buyer will be out of luck and the target will be 
sold to the new buyer.147 An important difference between the ini-
tial and the outside buyers is that, while the new buyer is free to 
revise and increase its earlier bid, the initial buyer is constrained 
to match the outside buyer’s bid only once. A limited match right 
creates an uneven playing field in favor of the outside buyer and 
against the initial buyer. When the outside buyer is aware of the 
fact that the initial buyer can match its offer only once (while the 
outside buyer is free to revise its offer), it is readily apparent that 
 
right the inside buyer will benefit while the target will suffer. In that case, if the outside 
buyer has a valuation of $115 million, rather than triggering an auction, it will simply 
decline to participate. This will allow the inside buyer to acquire the target at $110 million 
(rather than at $115 million). 
 146 As we saw in Part II.B, allowing the buyer to match a third party’s offer only once 
seems to be the most common type of limited match right. I have not been able to find a 
real-life example in which a limited match right allowed the buyer to match more than 
once. 
 147 I am, of course, taking a simplified and stylized view of how match rights work for 
the purposes of presenting a simple numerical example. For a more detailed legal analysis, 
see supra Part II.B. 
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the outside buyer has no incentive to start the competition by 
making an offer that is substantially more attractive than the ini-
tial price. 
For instance, suppose the outside buyer’s reservation value 
is $130 million (which, as assumed, happens with 30% probabil-
ity). The outside buyer (B1) will start the competition by making 
an offer that is slightly higher than the initial price of $110 mil-
lion. When the initial buyer is asked to match that offer, we can 
see that, no matter what the matching bid is, the initial buyer 
(B1) will lose the competition and the $130 million buyer (B3) will 
be able to acquire the target. Given that the initial buyer (B1) 
values the target at $120 million, the initial buyer’s matching of-
fer will be below its reservation value of $120 million and B3 will 
be able to acquire the target by revising its offer to be slightly 
higher than the initial buyer’s revised offer. For instance, sup-
pose, B3 makes an offer at $111 million and B1 makes a “match-
ing” bid of $117 million. B3 will now be able to purchase the target 
by offering $118 million. The bottom line is that when the outside 
buyer’s reservation value is $130 million, (1) the target will al-
ways be sold to the outside buyer; and (2) the final sale price will 
be (at least slightly) lower than the initial buyer’s reservation 
value ($120 million). 
What if the outside buyer’s reservation value is, instead, 
$115 million? Just like the outside buyer with a $130 million val-
uation, the buyer (B2), knowing that it can increase its bid ex post 
in response to the initial buyer’s match, will start the bidding at 
slightly above the current price of $110 million. From the initial 
buyer’s perspective, it does not know whether the topping bid is 
coming from the buyer with a $130 or $115 million valuation. 
But, it does know that if it were coming from the buyer (B3) with 
$130 million valuation, it will lose the bidding for certain, 
whereas if it were coming from the buyer (B2) with $115 million 
valuation, it may be able to prevail in the competition. The best 
strategy for the initial buyer, therefore, is to match the outside 
buyer’s bid by bidding slightly higher than $115 million. By doing 
so, the initial buyer (B1) retains the chance of winning the auction 
at least 40% of the time, conditional on there being an outside 
bidder. When the initial buyer bids at slightly above $115 million 
(say, $116 million), the $130 million valuation buyer (B3) will top 
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that bid (with, say, $117 million) while the $115 million buyer 
(B2) will decline to increase its bid above $115 million.148 
3. Unlimited match right. 
Now, suppose the initial buyer is given an unlimited match 
right (M = ∞). That is, whenever an outside buyer revises its ini-
tial offer, the initial buyer will be able to come back and match 
the revised offer from the outside bidder. Unlike the case with a 
limited match right, with an unlimited match right, the initial 
buyer and the outside buyer will have even standing in an auc-
tion. As each revises its bid, the other is able to top the competi-
tor’s bid. An unlimited match right replicates a proper English 
auction. When a competing buyer (B2 or B3) emerges, given that 
the existing price is equal to $110 million, knowing that both par-
ties will be able to continue matching the other’s bid, the topping 
bid will start at a little above $110 million149 and will continue 
rising until one bidder decides to drop out. For instance, if the 
outside buyer’s (B2’s) valuation for the target is $115 million, the 
initial buyer (B1), with a higher valuation of $120 million, will be 
able to continue “matching” the outside buyer’s (B2’s) offer until 
the bid rises to the outside buyer’s valuation of $115 million. The 
inside buyer wins the auction process at a price equal to (or 
 
 148 More precisely, we can construct a pooling equilibrium in the following way. Work-
ing backwards, first, suppose either B2 or B3 are to submit a follow-up bid after observing 
B1’s matching bid. The optimal strategy for B2 and B3 is to submit a follow-up bid that is 
slightly higher than B1’s matching bid so long as B1’s matching bid is below $115 million 
and $130 million, respectively. Otherwise, the bidder drops out. Second, suppose it is B1’s 
turn to submit a matching bid. If the outside bidder’s type has not been revealed in the 
earlier stage, B1’s optimal strategy is to (1) bid slightly above $115 million if the outside 
bid is anywhere between $110 and $115 million and (2) bid slightly above any outside bid 
above $115 million so long as the outside bid is below $120 million. Third, turning to the 
initial stage, the optimal strategy for B2 and B3 is to submit the initial bid between 
$110 and $115 million. So, in a pooling equilibrium, both B2 and B3 submit the initial bid 
that is between $110 and $115 million; B1 submits a matching bid slightly above $115 million; 
B3 comes back with a bid slightly above B1’s matching bid; and B2 drops out after observ-
ing B1’s matching bid. 
 149 If the third-party buyer knew (1) how much the initial buyer valued the target and 
(2) that the initial buyer’s valuation is larger than the third party’s valuation, the third 
party would not trigger the bidding competition. See Subramanian & Zhao, supra note 31, 
at 1234 (“When the first bidder has an unlimited match right, a third party will bid only 
if it believes it can beat the first bidder in a bidding contest.”). In the absence of such 
knowledge, given that the third party rationally believes that the initial buyer’s valuation 
can be anywhere above the deal price (of $110 million), that the third party does not know 
whether it can beat the initial buyer for certain, and that the third party can always come 
back with a revised offer, the optimal strategy is to start the bidding process at slightly 
above the deal price. 
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slightly higher than) the outside buyer’s (B2’s) reservation value 
of $115 million. Similarly, when the outside buyer’s (B3’s) valua-
tion is $130 million, the inside buyer and the outside buyer will 
be able to compete against each other in an even auction compe-
tition until the bid reaches the inside buyer’s valuation of 
$120 million. 
In either case, whether B2 or B3 appears on the scene, as in 
a standard English auction, the target gets sold to the buyer with 
the higher valuation at a price equal to the valuation of the losing 
bidder: with the $115 million outside buyer (B2), the target gets 
sold to the existing buyer at $115 million; and with the $130 million 
outside buyer (B3), the target is sold to the outside buyer at 
$120 million. Since the target is being sold to the buyer with the 
higher valuation, unlike in the case with a limited match right, 
there is no allocative inefficiency. Furthermore, and more im-
portantly, the target’s and the initial buyer’s joint expected profits 
and the target’s stand-alone expected profits will be higher, too. 
For instance, with a limited match right (M = 1), when the outside 
buyer’s valuation is equal to $130 million, because the initial 
buyer (B1) was matching the bid at (slightly above) $115 million, 
the target is sold to the outside buyer at a price strictly below the 
initial buyer’s valuation of $120 million. By contrast, with an  
unlimited match right, the target is sold to the outside buyer (B3) 
at the inside buyer’s valuation of $120 million. This increases 
both the joint profit of the initial buyer and the target and also 
the stand-alone profit of the target. 
4. Some generalizations and comparisons. 
The numerical example has, so far, assumed that the initial 
buyer knows exactly what the likely valuations of the outside buy-
ers are: it would be either $130 or $115 million. In a more realistic 
scenario when the distribution of the outside buyer’s valuation 
isn’t as simplistic, while the findings above will still remain cor-
rect, it creates three variations. First, when the inside buyer has 
a limited match right, the target may be sold to a lower valuation 
buyer: an allocative inefficiency may result. Second, unlike the 
case with a termination fee, where the inside buyer’s stand-alone 
profit always increased as the termination fee got larger, the in-
side buyer’s (B1’s) stand-alone profit may be higher or lower with 
an unlimited match right. Third, with a more generalized distri-
bution, low valuation of the outside buyer’s (B2’s) stand-alone 
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profit will be higher when the inside buyer has a limited, rather 
than unlimited, match right. 
First and foremost, suppose the outside buyer’s valuation can 
range anywhere between $110 and $130 million, the inside buyer 
has a limited match right (M = 1), and the outside buyer starts the 
bidding process at slightly above $110 million. Suppose also that 
the initial buyer (B1), without knowing how much the outside 
buyer is willing to pay for the target, matches the bid at anywhere 
between the new bid and its own valuation of $120 million, say, 
at $116 million. Unlike the case with two-point distribution (of 
either $115 or $130 million), now, any time the outside buyer’s 
valuation falls between the initial buyer’s (B1’s) matching bid (of 
$116 million) and the buyer’s valuation (of $120 million), the out-
side buyer will be able to win the auction even though the outside 
buyer values the target less than the initial buyer. For instance, 
if the outside buyer values the target at $118 million, after ob-
serving the initial buyer’s matching bid of $116 million, the out-
side buyer will be able to come back with a more attractive bid of, 
say, $117 million, and win the auction even though its valuation 
of the target is lower than the inside buyer’s. In short, in a more 
realistic setting, a limited match right can create allocative inef-
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(P = $110; M = 1) 
Unlimited Match 
Right 
(P = $110; M = ∞) 
Target (S)  
Expected Profit 
(Res. Value = $100) 
$12.5 million $14 million 
Initial Buyer (B1)  
Expected Profit 
(Res. Value = $120) 
$6 million 
(Likely lower with 
more general  
distribution) 
$6 million 
Target and Initial 
Buyer Joint Profit 
$18.5 million $20 million 
New Buyer (B2) Profit 
(Res. Value = $115) 
$0 
(Higher with  
more general  
distribution) 
$0 
New Buyer (B3) Profit 
(Res. Value = $130) 
$15 million $10 million 
Possible Inefficient 
Sale of Target? 
Yes No 
 
Second, while the result will depend on the assumption of the 
outside buyer’s valuation distribution, the inside buyer’s stand-
alone profit will likely decrease as we shift from limited to unlim-
ited match rights. In the numerical example, because the outside 
buyer’s valuation was limited to being either $115 or $130 million, 
and with a limited match right, the inside buyer was matching 
the outside buyer’s bid at (slightly above) $115 million, the ex-
pected profit of the inside buyer stayed the same at $6 million: a 
50% chance it acquires the target at $110 million (for a profit of 
$10 million) and a 20% chance it acquires the target at (slightly 
above) $115 million (for a profit of $5 million). But this is because 
 
 150 As discussed above, with a limited match right, when B2’s valuation is not fixed 
at $115 million but is on a continuum between $110 and $120 million, for instance, B2’s 
profit will be strictly larger than $0 while B1’s stand-alone expected profit may be higher 
or lower than $6 million. 
810 The University of Chicago Law Review [88:757 
 
the inside buyer knew exactly what B2’s valuation of the target 
was and managed to shut out B2 from winning the auction. If, for 
instance, the outside buyer’s valuation was on a continuum be-
tween $110 and $130 million, not only would the inside buyer’s 
matching bid possibly be higher or lower than $115 million, but 
the inside buyer’s probability of winning will also differ. While 
this could either increase or decrease the inside buyer’s (B1’s) 
stand-alone expected profit, given that, in case the outside buyer’s 
valuation falls between $110 million and $120 million, the inside 
buyer is no longer guaranteed to win the bidding competition, it 
will likely reduce the inside buyer’s stand-alone profit.151 
Finally, under the current setup, where B2’s valuation is 
fixed at $115 million, B2 is always shut out from being able to 
purchase the target (because of B1’s strategy of submitting the 
matching bid of $115 million). But when B2’s valuation isn’t fixed 
at $115 million and B1’s match right is limited, B2’s stand-alone 
profit will increase. For instance, imagine B2’s valuation can be 
anywhere between $110 and $120 million. Now, in response to 
B2’s starting the bidding process at $110 million, B1 will submit 
a matching bid that is between $110 million and $120 million and 
B2, whose valuation is above B1’s matching bid, will now be able 
to win the auction and realize a profit. When B1 had an unlimited 
match right, B2’s winning the auction was not possible. B2’s ex 
ante profit will be higher when the inside buyer has a limited 
match right than an unlimited match right. The second column of 
Table 2 summarizes these findings. 
C. Termination Fees Versus Match Rights 
When comparing these two deal protection devices, some in-
teresting similarities and differences emerge. As we moved (in 
Part III.A) from no termination fee to a positive (and substantial) 
termination fee, the joint profit of the target and the inside buyer 
increased while the outside buyer’s expected profit decreased. 
Similarly, as we moved (in Part III.B) from a limited match right 
to an unlimited match right, the joint profit of the target and the 
inside buyer went up while the outside buyer’s expected profit 
went down. Consistent with the practitioners’ observations, 
 
 151 For instance, if B2’s valuation is uniformly distributed between $110 and 
$120 million (while B3’s valuation is anywhere above $120 million), it is fairly easy to show 
that the optimal strategy for the inside buyer is to submit a match bid of $115 million. In 
that case, while B1’s profit margin stays the same, B1’s probability of winning, conditional 
on B2’s appearance, decreases by half, thereby lowering B1’s expected profit. 
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unlimited match rights and termination fees are generally bad for 
the competing buyer. To the extent that the outside buyer has to 
spend (possibly substantial) resources in participating in the bid, 
the lower expected profit can potentially translate to a lower rate 
of participation. At the same time, however, as the numerical  
examples show, an important goal of agreeing to either a termina-
tion fee or an unlimited match right is to extract more surplus 
from a high-valuation outside buyer (such as B3). And to the extent 
that an outside buyer’s valuation for the target is substantially 
high, the reduction in auction participation may be less likely or 
unlikely. After all, the numerical examples already show how 
these deal protection devices can shut out low-valuation buyers 
(such as B2), whose expected profit may not justify their partici-
pation costs. 
There are also some important differences between the two 
devices. First and foremost, as we moved (in Part III.A) from no 
termination fee to a positive and substantial termination fee, al-
locative efficiency suffered: if the outside buyer had only moder-
ately higher valuation than the inside buyer, the outside buyer 
was shut out from competition. As the size of termination fee got 
larger, the outside buyers were subject to a larger disadvantage 
vis-à-vis the inside buyer. By contrast, when we moved (in 
Part III.B) from a limited match right to an unlimited match 
right, allocative efficiency actually improved: by creating a more 
even playing field among the inside buyer and the outside buyer, 
an unlimited match right created an English auction–like envi-
ronment. Another important difference is on the target’s stand-
alone expected profit. Holding the initial deal price constant, 
when the target agreed to a termination fee, its stand-alone profit 
suffered. By contrast, even with the same deal price, when we 
switched (in Part III.B) from a limited match right to an unlim-
ited match right, the target’s stand-alone expected profit actually 
increased. 
Finally, consider the possibility of the transacting parties uti-
lizing both a termination fee and a match right. In such a case, 
the interaction between the two deal protection devices can pro-
duce some interesting results. For instance, with a limited match 
right, because a termination fee increases the reserve price in the 
auction, a higher termination fee can mitigate (or even eliminate) 
the potential inefficiency that stems from the limited match right. 
This will especially be the case when the termination fee is equal 
to the difference between the initial buyer’s reservation value and 
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the deal price. When the initial buyer values the target at 
$120 million, the deal price is $110 million, and the termination fee 
is $10 million, for instance, a third-party buyer will enter the compe-
tition only when it values the target at more than $120 million, 
and when it does so, the initial buyer will decline to match: the 
target will be sold to a third-party buyer only when the third-
party buyer values the target more. By contrast, when the match 
right is unlimited, so long as the termination fee is less than the 
difference in the initial buyer’s valuation and the deal price, al-
locative efficiency is not affected.152 
D. Interdependent Valuation and the “Winner’s Curse” 
Problem 
So far, the numerical examples have assumed that while the 
buyers and the target do not observe other buyers’ valuations, 
they know their own (although their valuations may be corre-
lated). This assumption sets up a private value auction.153 Alter-
natively, we could have assumed a more “interdependent” or 
“common” valuation structure, in which each buyer does not know 
its own valuation and only gets a “signal” about the valuation.154 
While the assumption of an interdependent valuation raises the 
possibility of what is known as the “winner’s curse” problem155—
in which the winner of the auction ends up paying more for the 
target than it values—this possibility does not arise when the 
parties engage in an ascending-bid English auction. The primary 
reason is that when the bidders observe whether the other com-
peting bidders are participating in the auction, they can infer the 
signals that the other bidders have gotten and the informational 
issues disappear or are (substantially) mitigated.156 In the case of 
 
 152 Whether or not the match right is limited, when the termination fee is higher than 
the difference between the initial buyer’s valuation and the deal price, allocative ineffi-
ciency will result. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 153 See VIJAY KRISHNA, AUCTION THEORY 13–28 (2002). 
 154 Id. at 83–102. As an example of a common-value setting, suppose both an inside 
buyer (B1) and an outside buyer (B2) get respective signals about valuation (X1 and X2), 
B1 only observes X1 and B2 only observes X2, and the common value for the target is given 
by V = 0.5 * X1 + 0.5 * X2. In this setting, for B1, for instance, even after drawing a very 
high signal (a realization of X1), it does not know the true value of the target without 
knowing the realization of X2. It’s possible that if the realization of X2 is sufficiently low, 
its true valuation is substantially lower than what the realization of X1 indicates. 
 155 Id. at 84–85. 
 156 Id. at 85. When the bidders are competing in a sealed-bid, first-price auction, by 
contrast, the fact that one has won the auction (without knowing others’ signals) implies 
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no termination fee or an unlimited match right, the optimal strat-
egy for the outside buyers (B2 or B3) is to start the bidding pro-
cess by offering a price that is slightly more than the deal price 
 
that the winner has likely drawn the highest possible signal and the true value of the asset 
is likely lower (given that others have drawn lower signals). 
 Some commentators have argued that because the initial buyer has an informational 
advantage against an outside buyer, the presence of an unlimited match right can sub-
stantially impede the outside buyer from competing against the inside buyer. See supra 
note 84 and accompanying text. There are three issues to consider with respect to this 
concern: 
 First, while this may be true in a sealed-bid first-price auction setting (e.g., where the 
outside buyer has to make a onetime bid and the inside buyer is given the right to either 
match or not match the bid), in an English auction setting, where the bidders can observe 
the others’ behavior and they continue bidding against one another (and infer the others’ 
valuation signals), this will not be true. The fact that the informational advantage does 
not per se create a winner’s curse problem in an English auction setting can be seen using 
the following, simple example. Suppose both an inside buyer (B1) and an outside buyer 
(B2) get a respective signal about valuation (X1 and X2): B1 only observes X1 and B2 only 
observes X2. Suppose also that B1’s valuation is given by V1 = X1 while B2’s valuation is 
given by V2 = δX1 = (1 – δ)X2, where δ ∈ (0,1). By assumption, therefore, B1 knows its 
valuation for certain, while B2’s valuation depends on both its own signal X2 and B1’s 
signal X1. B1 has an informational advantage against B2. (We can impose some distribu-
tional structure here, but for the sake of simplicity, we skip that discussion.) It is easy to 
show that the dominant strategy for B1 is to stay in the auction until the price reaches 
X1. The optimal strategy for B2 is, then, to stay in the auction until the price is equal to 
X2 (or possibly some price that is higher than X2). With these equilibrium bidding strate-
gies, there are two possibilities. Suppose B2’s strategy is to stay in the auction until the 
price reaches X2. First, suppose X2 > X1. As the price rises, B1 drops out when the price 
reaches X1; and B2 wins the auction at price equal to X1. B2 acquires the target at X1 and 
realizes a strictly positive surplus of V2 – X1 > 0. The auction achieves allocative effi-
ciency. Suppose, instead, X1 > X2. In this case, B2 drops out when the price hits X2 and 
B1 wins the auction. Again, allocative efficiency is achieved. In sum, even with the infor-
mational disadvantage, B2 does not suffer the winner’s curse problem. 
 Second, in fact, given that the inside buyer has already signaled its willingness to 
purchase the target through the acquisition price ($110 million in our example), the infor-
mational advantage may actually be reversed to the extent that the price of the agreement 
can (at least partially) reveal the inside buyer’s valuation. 
 The third point respects information rights. According to Kling, Nugent, and Van 
Dyke, in order to make sure that a deal protection device does not unduly impede third 
parties from competing against the initial buyer, the target should be able to 
disclose confidential information to any third party who has on its own (i.e., not 
been solicited) “shown up” in the sense that it has submitted a proposal or, at a 
minimum, an indication of interest which is, or which the target believes is, rea-
sonably likely to lead to (and who is capable of consummating) a higher compet-
ing bid. In this regard, the target should also be able to negotiate with such third 
parties. This removes any informational advantage that the (initial) anointed 
purchaser may have. 
KLING, NUGENT & VAN DYKE, supra note 36, § 4.04[6][b], at 4-94 to -95 (citations omitted). 
The presence of such information right will also likely eliminate (or substantially reduce) the 
initial buyer’s informational advantage. See Quinn, supra note 31, at 1042–43 (discussing 
various information rights given to the initial bidder can exacerbate the problem of infor-
mation asymmetry). 
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and to continuously update and match B1’s bid. After all, the out-
side buyers know that B1 at least values the target at the deal 
price, and being able to observe B1’s competing offer allows them 
to update their information on how much B1 values the target. 
With an even playing field and with an ascending-bid, English-
auction structure, the winner’s curse problem does not arise. 
When the playing field is uneven, on the other hand, there is 
a possibility that, concerned about the potential winner’s curse 
problem, either the outside or the inside buyer may decline to par-
ticipate. This can happen when the deal structure contains a 
(large) positive termination fee or when the inside buyer has only 
a limited match right. Recall that, in either situation, either the 
outside buyer (when there is a termination fee) or the inside buyer 
(with a limited match right) is forced to submit a jump bid. For 
instance, when the deal price is $110 million but the deal is sub-
ject to a $10 million termination fee, for B2 or B3 to compete 
against B1, they have to submit an initial competing bid that is 
higher than $120 million. If, for instance, B2’s or B3’s valuation 
also depends on the information that B1 has (the valuations are 
interdependent) and the outside buyers are sufficiently concerned 
about whether their true valuation falls below $120 million (but 
above $110 million), they may decline to compete against B1. This 
may be so, even though B2’s or B3’s true valuation of the target 
is higher than B1’s valuation. Similarly, when B1 can match out-
side buyer’s bid only once, and B1 is unsure about its true valua-
tion for the target (because its valuation depends also on the in-
formation that B2 or B3 has), concerned about the possible 
winner’s curse problem, it will no longer be able to make an ag-
gressive jump (matching) bid. This can, in turn, make it more 
likely that the target is sold to an outside buyer even though B1 
may have a higher valuation. 
In sum, when moving to a more general, interdependent val-
uation structure, there is a potential winner’s curse problem, but 
in a way that renders both termination fees and limited match 
rights worse for achieving allocative efficiency. In both cases, the 
possible inefficiency results from forcing either the outside or the 
inside buyer to make a jump bid. With a positive termination fee, 
the outside buyer has to submit a jump bid, whereas with a lim-
ited match right, the inside buyer has to submit a matching bid 
that may be substantially higher than the outside buyer’s com-
peting bid. By contrast, when there is no termination fee or the 
inside buyer has an unlimited match right, the concerns over 
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suffering a winner’s curse will be substantially mitigated or elim-
inated with interdependent valuations and this, in turn, can bet-
ter promote allocative efficiency. 
E. Other Deal Protection Devices 
So far, my principal focus has been on match rights and ter-
mination fees. But the auction-theory-based analysis can be eas-
ily extended to other deal protection mechanisms, notably stock 
and asset lockups.157 In the case of a stock lockup, the inside buyer 
is entitled to purchase a fraction of the target’s outstanding stock 
at a contractually stipulated price in case the target is sold to a 
competing buyer, whereas with an asset lockup, the inside buyer is 
entitled to acquire the target’s asset (or division) at a predetermined 
price. Although both mechanisms are facially similar to a breakup 
fee (in the sense that they compensate a disappointed buyer), 
there are some important differences. Notably, while the size (or 
the value) of a termination fee is independent of how much the 
outside buyer pays for the target, the value of a stock lockup is 
proportionate to the outside buyer’s purchase price. This provides 
an incentive to the inside buyer to be more aggressive in its bid-
ding against the outside buyer. With aggressive bidding, alloca-
tive inefficiencies can arise. With an asset lockup, unlike a 
breakup fee, the value of the pledged asset can differ across the 
buyers, and this will affect how much each buyer would be willing 
to pay for the target. In this Section, I will demonstrate this with 
a few extensions of the previous numerical examples. 
1. Stock lockup. 
Recall that the inside buyer (B1) valued the target at 
$120 million and initially agreed to acquire the target at 
$110 million. Now, suppose B1 is also given the right to purchase 
10% of the target’s outstanding stock based on a valuation of 
$100 million (P0) in case the target is sold to a different buyer. 
With the strike price of $100 million, if the target gets sold to an-
other buyer at $130 million, for instance, B1 will be able to realize 
a profit of $3 million (= 0.1 * ($130 million – $100 million)) by 
 
 157 While there are other deal protection mechanisms, such as no-shop clauses, stand-
still and voting agreements, and information rights, they are not discussed for the sake of 
brevity. See Quinn, supra note 31, at 1016 (discussing, in more detail, various information 
rights that come with match rights); Davidoff & Sautter, supra note 34, at 711 (arguing 
that the courts should broaden their analysis of other protective measures). 
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exercising this stock lockup option and (immediately) reselling 
the stock to the winning buyer. Given that B1 is willing to pay up 
to $120 million for the target, in case B1 wins the auction at price 
P, it will realize a profit of $120 million – P. On the other hand, 
in case B1 loses the auction and the winning bid is P, it gets to 
realize a profit of 0.1 * (P – $100 million).158 Even this simple ex-
ample shows an important difference between a termination fee 
and a stock lockup. With a termination fee, the proceeds that the 
disappointed B1 receives are fixed (at T). With a stock lockup, 
however, the compensation for B1 depends directly on the win-
ning bid: the higher the winning bid, the higher the compensation 
for the inside buyer. This provides a strong incentive to B1 to try 
to increase the winning bid as much as it can. 
How much B1 can push up the winning price depends, in 
part, on how much the outside buyer is willing to pay for the target 
when B1 has the stock lockup. Using the example, suppose the 
outside buyer values the target at either $115 million (by B2) or 
$130 million (by B3). Knowing that B1 is entitled to sell 10% of 
the target stock at $100 million to the winning outside buyer, in 
case B2 or B3 wins the auction at P, the outside buyer has to pay 
P + 0.1 * (P – $100 million). That is, for 10% of the outstanding 
stock, the winning outside bidder has to pay an additional differ-
ence of P – $100 million. This will naturally reduce the maximum 
price the outside buyer would be willing to pay for the target. B2, 
for instance, would now be willing to stay in the auction until 
P ≈ $113.64 million; and B3 would be willing to stay in the auc-
tion until P ≈ $127.27 million.159 At the same time, for B1, given 
that it will be able to realize a profit of 0.1 * (P – $100 million) in case 
it loses the competition and it values the target at $120 million, 
B1 will be willing to stay in the auction at least until the price 
reaches P ≈ $118.18 million.160 
 
 158 More generally, if the inside buyer is entitled to purchase a fraction, α ∈ (0,1), of 
the target’s outstanding stock at the exercise price of P0, the inside buyer’s profit if it loses 
the competition and the winning bid is equal to P is α(P – P0). See supra Part I.A (discuss-
ing Paramount v. QVC and the use of a stock lockup). 
 159 These numbers are calculated as follows: When an outside buyer values the target 
at Ri and the inside buyer is entitled to a fraction, α, of the target stock at P0, the outside 
buyer would be willing to pay up to P such that Ri = P + α(P – P0). When we solve for P, 
we get P = (Ri + αP0) / (1 + α). 
 160 With the reservation value of R1, the inside buyer would be willing to stay in the 
auction until R1 – P = α(P – P0). When we solve for P, we get P = (R1 + αP0) / (1 + α). Note 
that the stock lockup affects the de facto “reservation values” of the inside and the outside 
buyers by the exact same proportions. Hence, when the bidders are aware of each other’s 
reservation values, the presence of a stock lockup does not affect who will be able to 
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But will the inside buyer drop out of the race when the price 
reaches $118.18 million? The answer is no. Recall that the as-
sumption was that each buyer only knows its own valuation but 
not the valuations of others. The example made a further simpli-
fying assumption that while B2 or B3 did not know B1’s valua-
tion, B1 knew that the outside buyer’s valuation was either 
$115 or $130 million. This implies that when the auction price 
reaches $118.18 million, rather than dropping out of the competi-
tion, the optimal strategy for B1 is to stay in the auction until it 
reaches (slightly less than) $127.27 million. With the stock 
lockup, while dropping out at $118.18 million would have pro-
duced a profit of about $1.82 million (≈ 0.1 * ($118.18 million – 
$100 million)), pushing the winning bid up to $127.27 million  
allows B1 to realize a higher profit of about $2.73 million (≈ 0.1 * 
($127.27 million – $100 million)). Obviously, the assumption that 
B1 knew that the outside buyer’s valuations were either $115 or 
$130 million is extreme. But the point is that when buyers do not 
know other buyers’ valuations and when one buyer is given a 
stock lockup, because the size of the lockup increases with the 
winning bid, the lockup recipient will have an incentive to be 
more aggressive in its bidding.161 
The result that a stock lockup makes the recipient more ag-
gressive in its bidding strategy leads to a couple of important im-
plications. The first is that it can sometimes lead to allocative in-
efficiency by shutting out an outside buyer who values the target 
only marginally or moderately more than the inside buyer. From 
the example, if an outside buyer valued the target only slightly 
more than the inside buyer, say, at $121 or $122 million, when 
the inside buyer becomes more aggressive and pushes up the auc-
tion price, even though the outside buyer values the target more, 
it will be shut out from the competition. Another implication is 
that, with a stock lockup, both the target’s stand-alone profit and 
the joint profit of the inside buyer and the target can actually in-
crease. By pushing up the (expected) winning auction price, although 
an outside buyer who values the target only moderately more 
than the inside buyer will be shut out, the target and the inside 
buyer can extract more rent from the outside buyer who values 
the target considerably more. The effect is similar to promising a 
 
purchase the target (i.e., there is no allocative inefficiency). In this symmetric information 
setting, the target will, on the other hand, realize a lower profit. This replicates Professor 
Ayres’s principal finding. Ayres, supra note 34, at 695. 
 161 For a more general analysis, see Che & Lewis, supra note 32, at 653–54. 
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large termination fee as seen earlier, when the target and the in-
side buyer can increase their joint profit by extracting more rent 
from a high-valuation outside buyer.162 
2. Asset lockup. 
When the target grants an asset lockup to a buyer, the recip-
ient is entitled to purchase the target’s promised asset (or a divi-
sion) at a predetermined price when a competing buyer acquires 
the target.163 Although the mechanics are quite similar to a ter-
mination fee, unlike with cash, buyers can assign different valu-
ations to the asset, and an asset lockup can create allocative inef-
ficiency. Coming back to the numerical example, suppose B1 is given 
the right to purchase a target’s asset that is worth $10 million to 
B1 at $5 million (the exercise price). However, due to the syner-
gies that the asset creates for the target’s remaining assets, once 
the asset is taken out of the target, outside buyers’ valuations go 
down by $15 million. With the $5 million cash payment from B1, 
the net reduction in valuation for the outside buyers would be 
$10 million. Given that the asset lockup allows B1 to realize a 
profit of $5 million in case it loses the target, B1 would be willing 
to bid only up to $115 million for the target. Similarly, B2 and B3 
would be willing to pay only up to $105 million and $120 million, 
respectively. 
With the asset lockup in place and the initial deal price of 
$110 million (between B1 and S), now B2 will no longer partici-
pate in the auction. When B3 enters the competition, after bid-
ding B3 will be able to acquire the target (minus the asset) at 
(slightly more than) $115 million, the maximum B1 is willing to 
pay for the target. Compared to the case without any lockups, the 
target clearly suffers (because of B2’s lack of participation and lower 
proceeds from B3’s winning), while B1 clearly gains. Although it 
seems as though allocative efficiency is preserved, because of the 
asset lockup, $5 million in value is being destroyed. Without any 
lockup, the target would have generated a gross value of $130 million 
(in B3’s hands). With the asset lockup, the gross value of the target 
plus the asset is $125 million (= $115 million + $10 million). An 
asset lockup can also prevent a higher-value bidder from 
 
 162 The effect is quite similar to that of granting the inside buyer a right of first re-
fusal. See generally Choi, supra note 139 (showing how a right of first refusal allows an 
inside buyer and a seller to extract rent from a higher-valuing outside buyer). 
 163 See supra Part I.A (discussing Revlon and the use of an asset lockup). 
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acquiring the target. If, for instance, B3’s gross valuation of the 
target had been $124 million (instead of $130 million), because 
B3 would have been willing to pay only up to $114 million for the 
target (minus the asset) when B1 had the asset lockup, B3 would 
be unable to win the competition even though B3 would have val-
ued the target (as a whole) more than B1.164 
There is one important difference that distinguishes an asset 
lockup from other deal protection measures. While it is plausible 
that other deal protection devices, including termination fees, 
match rights, and stock lockups, can under certain conditions in-
crease the target and inside buyer’s joint profit, this is quite un-
likely with respect to an asset lockup. The primary mechanism 
through which a deal protection device can enhance the joint 
profit is through the extraction of additional surplus from an out-
side buyer with a high valuation. In the case of a termination fee, 
this is achieved through a large fee. A stock lockup or a match 
right creates additional profit by enhancing the competitive pos-
ture of the inside buyer. Because an asset lockup, by contrast, ac-
tually lowers an outside buyer’s reservation value (and the poten-
tial surplus that the target and inside buyer can attempt to 
capture), it is quite unlikely that an asset lockup can increase the 
joint profit of the target and inside buyer, let alone the target’s 
stand-alone profit. An asset lockup is the most problematic of all 
in potentially undermining both efficiency and the target’s return. 
IV.  CORPORATE AND CONTRACT LAW IMPLICATIONS FOR  
DEAL PROTECTION DEVICES 
The analysis in the previous Part showed that, when properly 
structured, deal protection devices, such as a termination fee and 
a match right, can enhance the joint expected return of a target 
and an inside buyer. But the issue whether a deal protection device 
can enhance the target shareholders’ return is more subtle. As 
seen earlier, holding the initial deal price fixed, when the target 
agrees to a larger termination fee, the target’s stand-alone profit 
decreases while the inside buyer’s expected return increases. By 
contrast, when the target agrees to an unlimited match right, 
both the target’s and the inside buyer’s returns (are likely to) 
 
 164 When the size of the asset lockup is substantial, it can also deter a higher-value 
bidder from entering the competition. For instance, if an outside buyer values the target 
at $122 million ($2 million higher than B1) but losing the asset would cost the bidder (in 
net) more than $12 million, given the initial deal price of $110 million, the bidder would 
decline to compete against B1. 
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increase. Similarly, with a stock lockup, both the target’s and the 
inside buyer’s returns increase. In these cases, the joint profit of 
the target and the inside buyer go up as deal protection devices 
become stronger. 
A. Target Directors’ Role in Deploying Deal Protection Devices 
For the target to share the benefit of increased joint profit, in 
the case of a termination fee, the directors (and the officers) of the 
target corporation have to negotiate with the buyer to increase 
the deal price. As seen earlier, by agreeing to a termination fee of 
$8 million while receiving a corresponding increase in the deal 
price from $110 million to $116 million, the target is able to real-
ize a higher profit of $16 million. With respect to a match right, 
while successfully convincing the inside buyer to agree to an un-
limited match right can increase the target’s profit, to the extent 
that the inside buyer may also benefit from an unlimited match 
right, the issue is whether the target directors can receive further 
concessions from the inside buyer. Nonetheless, the issue of ex-
tracting a bigger deal premium isn’t as important as in the case 
with a large termination fee. A similar argument would also apply 
to a stock lockup. 
Ultimately, then, whether deal protection devices can benefit 
or harm the target shareholders depends on the target directors’ 
and officers’ incentives. Properly incentivized directors and offic-
ers will utilize deal protection devices to increase the return for 
the target shareholders, while unincentivized directors and offic-
ers can deploy the same devices to favor one buyer over another 
and to the detriment of the target shareholders. Presumably, the 
latter scenario is more likely, when the agents are to receive sub-
stantial private benefits from promoting one buyer over another. 
There are a number of possible scenarios. For instance, the target 
directors and the officers may be guaranteed post-merger employ-
ment by the initial buyer.165 There also could be other types of side 
agreements between the target directors and the officers with the 
initial buyer, such as a consulting or financing agreement. Still 
another possibility is that the target directors and the officers, as 
investors or employees of the initial buyer, could receive direct 
 
 165 Although the top executives are often entitled to receive severance payments, often 
known as golden parachutes, upon change of control, thereby inducing the top executives 
to possibly prefer selling the company, it is unlikely that such severance payments are 
structured so as to favor one buyer over another. 
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pecuniary benefits from consummating the merger with the ini-
tial buyer. Perhaps the agents are under the influence of a block 
holder (including a controlling shareholder) who may be pursuing 
a different agenda. Finally, even if they are not pursuing their 
own private benefits, when they are indifferent about shareholder 
welfare, they could accede too easily to the initial buyer’s de-
mands. In all of these scenarios, by agreeing to deal protection 
devices (especially a large termination fee) with the initial buyer 
without demanding anything in return, the target directors and 
officers can increase the chances of closing the deal with the ini-
tial buyer to the detriment of competition.166 
B. Deal Protection Devices and Determination of “Fair Value” 
in Appraisal 
Another dimension in which the directors’ and officers’ incen-
tives matter is with respect to the question whether the court can 
use the deal price as (reliable) evidence of fair value in an ap-
praisal proceeding. The deal price issue can be examined from 
both ex ante and ex post perspectives. From the ex ante perspec-
tive, as seen in the earlier analysis, when the target directors are 
maximizing the returns for the target shareholders, they will be 
able to negotiate a higher deal price in return for agreeing to a 
generous deal protection. When this is the case, to the extent that 
a court would consider an arm’s-length, negotiated deal price to 
be probative of fair value, that evidentiary weight would be high. 
With agents maximizing the return for the shareholders, the 
presence of a deal protection device should actually encourage, 
not discourage, the court to use the deal price as an indicator of 
fair value. This is true even when there is no topping bid. 
Even from the ex post perspective, we saw that the presence 
of a termination fee or an unlimited match right is more likely to 
produce a higher ex post deal price. For instance, when the high-
valuation buyer (B3) appears, an unlimited match right forces the 
outside buyer to pay the inside buyer’s valuation to acquire the 
target, thereby producing a higher ex post deal price. In short, 
when there is a topping bid and subsequent competition among 
 
 166 With respect to a termination fee, another possibility is that, in the absence of a 
competing bid, a large termination fee that gets triggered when the shareholders vote 
against the deal can meaningfully discourage the target shareholders from voting against 
the deal. Such a “naked no vote” termination fee (as seen in the Toys “R” Us case), is dif-
ferent from the usual termination fees that are triggered upon consummation of a compet-
ing deal. For a discussion, see supra Part I.A. 
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the buyers, using the winning bid as evidence of fair value will 
substantially enhance the target shareholders’ returns.167 When 
the directors’ and managers’ incentives are not properly aligned, 
on the other hand, there is no guarantee that the deal protection 
device will increase the deal premium, and the deal price becomes 
less reliable in determining fair value of the target shares.168 In 
such a setting, it would be better for the court to require an actual 
competition among buyers before using the final deal price in as-
sessing fair value. Table 3 summarizes the arguments. 






Incentives Are  
Not Aligned 
Incidence of Deal 
Protection Devices 
Likely Likely 
Initial Deal Price 
(Deal Premium) 
Higher Lower 
Return (Ex Ante) for 
the Target  
Shareholders 
Higher Lower 
Deal Price  
as Evidence of  
Fair Value? 
More Reliable Less Reliable 
C. Contract Law Considerations 
Deal protection devices also raise interesting contract law 
problems. Given that the devices can discourage (or even prohibit) 
a new bidder from competing against the inside buyer and can 
reduce the new bidder’s return, they impose a negative (contrac-
tual) externality on the new bidder. A deal protection device, es-
pecially a large termination fee, can function like a noncompete 
 
 167 For more in-depth analysis on the importance of an actual auction among compet-
ing buyers (where there are multiple bids, as opposed to simple expressions of interest) in 
enhancing target shareholders’ returns (and also in promoting efficiency), see Choi & Tal-
ley, supra note 23, at 559–60. 
 168 This concern is stronger with respect to termination fees than with match rights. 
As seen earlier, in order for the target shareholders to share in the additional surplus 
extracted through a large termination fee, the target directors must negotiate a higher 
initial deal price. For a match right, even if the target directors were to grant an unlimited 
match right, even without any price increase, the target shareholders can benefit. 
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agreement169 or an agreement to exclude entry (such as a con-
certed refusal to deal). Under contract law, when a contract im-
poses an “unreasonable” restraint on trade, the contract will be 
unenforceable based on public policy.170 Furthermore, especially 
with respect to termination fees, contract law prohibits the par-
ties from agreeing to liquidated damages that are unreasonably 
large as against public policy.171 An unreasonably large liquidated 
damages clause that allows a disappointed buyer to collect more 
than what the buyer was expecting to receive under the contract 
goes against the compensation objective of contract law remedies.172 
Given the difficulty of deciding whether a certain provision im-
poses an unreasonable restraint on trade or allows compensation 
that is unreasonably large, whether a certain deal protection device 
should be struck down under contract law should be determined 
on a case-by-case basis. 
Regarding termination fees, several factors can come into 
play. For instance, while practitioners often argue that a termi-
nation fee is necessary to compensate a disappointed buyer for all 
 
 169 See supra note 39. 
 170 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 186–187 (AM. L. INST. 2017). Sec-
tion 186(1), for instance, states that “[a] promise is unenforceable on grounds of public 
policy if it is unreasonably in restraint of trade.” Courts have utilized this provision to 
strike down unreasonable noncompete agreements. According to the official commentary, 
[e]very promise that relates to business dealings or to a professional or other 
gainful occupation operates as a restraint in the sense that it restricts the prom-
isor’s future activity. Such a promise is not, however, unenforceable unless the 
restraint that it imposes is unreasonably detrimental to the smooth operation of 
a freely competitive private economy. . . . Whether a restraint is reasonable is 
determined in the light of the circumstances of the transaction, including not 
only the particular facts but general social and economic conditions as well. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 186(1), cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2017). 
 171 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (AM. L. INST. 2017): 
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only 
at an amount that is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss 
caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss. A term fixing unreason-
ably large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a 
penalty. 
This is known as the “antipenalty” doctrine. See Aaron S. Edlin & Alan Schwartz, Optimal 
Penalties in Contracts, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 33, 48 (2003); Robert E. Scott & George G. 
Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 1428, 1456, 1481–82 (2004); see also Brazen, 695 A.2d at 49 (determining 
that the termination fee, as liquidated damages, was not in violation of the antipenalty 
rule); supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text. 
 172 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2017) (“The 
central objective behind the system of contract remedies is compensatory, not punitive.”); 
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2017) (“The pur-
pose[ ] of awarding contract damages is to compensate the injured party.”). 
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the expenses the buyer has incurred,173 the presence of an expense 
reimbursement provision174 along with the fact that the termina-
tion fee is much larger than the allowed expenses can strengthen 
the argument that the termination fee is unreasonable.175 More 
generally, one of the concerns of allowing liquidated damages that 
are too large is that it can lead to allocative inefficiency.176 While 
an evenhanded competition better promotes allocative efficiency, 
a termination fee that is substantially larger than the expenses 
incurred can impede that objective. Another factor may be the 
 
 173 See Brazen, 695 A.2d at 48–49: 
[The termination fee took into account] (a) the lost opportunity costs associated 
with a contract to deal exclusively with each other; (b) the expenses incurred 
during the course of negotiating the transaction; (c) the likelihood of a higher bid 
emerging for the acquisition of either party; and (d) the size of termination fees 
in other merger transactions. 
See also Nexstar-Tribune Merger Agreement, supra note 91, § 9.3(c), at 79; supra Part II.A 
(discussing the agreement). 
 174 See ABA MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 88, § 7.3, at 276. For instance, 
when the deal fails to close because the target consummates a deal with a different buyer 
or the target board changes its recommendation, the buyer is entitled to very generous 
expense reimbursement from the target. Section 7.3(a)(ii) states: 
Company shall make a nonrefundable cash payment to Parent, in an amount 
equal to the aggregate amount of all fees and expenses (including all attorneys’ 
fees, accountants’ fees, financial advisory fees and filing fees) that have been paid 
or that may become payable by or on behalf of Parent in connection with the 
preparation and negotiation of this Agreement and otherwise in connection with 
the Merger (the “Expense Reimbursement”) if this Agreement is terminated 
(A) by Parent or the Company pursuant to Section 7.1(b) and on or before the 
date of any such termination, an Acquisition Proposal shall have been publicly 
announced or disclosed or an Acquisition Proposal has otherwise been commu-
nicated to the Company Board, or (B) by Parent or the Company pursuant to 
Section 7.1(d) or (C) by Parent pursuant to either Section 7.1(e) or Section 7.1(f). 
Id. § 7.3(a)(ii), at 276 (emphasis added). 
 175 An important consideration here is that when the target is sold to a different 
buyer, the initial buyer no longer has an option to try to execute the deal again in the 
future. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 176 One of the economic justifications of expectation damages is that it facilitates al-
locative efficiency (the “efficient breach theory”): a contract will be breached when doing 
so will generate more surplus. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, 
Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and 
a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 558–59 (1977). But, the theory is 
usually based on the assumption that a contracting party gets to make a onetime breach 
decision and that there is no subsequent competition among the buyers, as in an auction. 
Once there is an auction, on the other hand, allocative efficiency is much more likely to be 
achieved and the goal of damages is to create a more even playing field among the inter-
ested buyers. This would be more feasible with reliance damages (such as expense reim-
bursement) than with expectation damages or any liquidated damages that are substan-
tially larger than reliance damages. 
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market conditions or the target’s bargaining power.177 When the 
acquisition market is very seller friendly or when the target is in 
a strong bargaining position, so that the deal price is close to the 
inside buyer’s reservation value, imposing even a moderate ter-
mination fee can generate allocative inefficiency.178 At the oppo-
site end of the spectrum, when the target is in a weak bargaining 
posture or the market is very buyer friendly, even a relatively 
large termination fee will not generate an inefficiency. In short, 
instead of concluding that a breakup fee of a certain percentage 
of the deal price (e.g., 3% or 5%) is reasonable across the board, 
that reasonableness determination should depend on a case-by-
case analysis that looks at several different factors, such as 
whether a generous expense reimbursement provision is also  
present, and whether the target enjoyed a strong bargaining po-
sition against the buyer. 
For a match right, since the right does not deal with the issue 
of compensation, the core concern, rather, is whether the right 
imposes an unreasonable restraint on trade. As we saw earlier, 
however, an unlimited match right, compared to a limited match 
right, is more likely to lower the outside buyer’s expected return 
but, at the same time, to increase the chances that the target will 
be sold to the buyer with a higher valuation. From an efficiency 
perspective, it is the limited match right that is more likely to 
impose constraint and perhaps should be more subject to judicial 
scrutiny under contract law.179 An unlimited match right, by con-
trast, does not, in general, unreasonably restrain trade (i.e., com-
petition for the target among inside and outside buyers). In sum, 
while both termination fees and unlimited match rights are likely 
 
 177 More precisely, as shown earlier, allocative inefficiency will result when the size 
of the termination fee is larger than the expected surplus from the deal for the initial 
buyer. See supra Part III.A. 
 178 One can think of termination fees as a “price” term in a contract—in this case, the 
price to walk away from the deal. When bargaining power shifts from one party to another, 
such a price term is most likely to be affected by that shift. See Albert Choi & George 
Triantis, The Effect of Bargaining Power on Contract Design, 98 VA. L. REV. 1665, 1678–
79 (2012) (analyzing the impact of a shift in bargaining power on both price and non-price 
terms in a contract); see also Badawi & de Fontenay, supra note 54, at 1154 (examining 
the impact of being the first drafter on various deal provisions). 
 179 This depends on our conception of “restraint of trade.” Given that a limited match 
right hampers the inside buyer’s competitive standing vis-à-vis outside buyers, one could 
conceptualize it as something akin to a noncompete agreement, although, of course, the 
analogy is not exact since a noncompete clause kicks in after the initial relationship has 
been terminated. 
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to reduce an outside buyer’s expected return, unlimited match 
rights facilitate allocative efficiency while termination fees do not. 
TABLE 4: CONTRACT LAW IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENT  





















Deal protection devices provide more confidence to the buyer 
that the deal will close and have been in the mergers and acqui-
sitions landscape for quite some time. Notwithstanding earlier ju-
dicial hostility against certain deal protection devices, particu-
larly during the hostile takeover era of the 1980s and early 1990s, 
courts recently have been much more willing to validate deal pro-
tection measures, particularly termination fees and match rights. 
In an influential opinion, for instance, then–Delaware Vice Chan-
cellor Leo Strine has called them “common contractual” fea-
tures.181 While most deal protection devices have been scrutinized 
within the frame of target directors’ fiduciary duties, most re-
cently, in the midst of heated controversy over whether courts 
should use the deal price as an indicator of fair value in an ap-
praisal proceeding, the Delaware Court of Chancery has pointed 
to the presence of such devices as undermining the usefulness of 
the deal price as relevant evidence. 
This Article has examined some of these issues, with a par-
ticular focus on whether deal protection devices will be detri-
mental to the target shareholders and whether the presence of 
such provisions should steer courts away from using deal price as 
 
 180 See supra note 161. 
 181 See In re Toys “R” Us, 877 A.2d at 1017; see also Part I.A. 
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evidence of fair value in appraisal proceedings. Applying simple 
auction theory, this Article has shown that deal protection devices 
can, under certain conditions, function as a contractual externality 
mechanism that allows the contracting parties to realize a higher 
joint return by extracting rent from a noncontracting party. While 
both match rights and termination fees can function as rent ex-
traction mechanisms, their incidence and effect can differ. An un-
limited match right, compared to a limited match right, will do 
better not only in enhancing the target’s return but also in mak-
ing sure that the target is sold to the buyer with the higher valu-
ation. By comparison, a termination fee, without any price con-
cession from the buyer, will reduce the target’s return and also 
impede the target from being sold to the buyer with the higher 
valuation. While an unlimited match right may not require a cor-
responding price concession from the buyer to increase the target’s 
return, a termination fee does. While the primary focus of this 
Article has been on termination fees and match rights, this Arti-
cle also deployed auction theory to examine other deal protection 
devices, notably stock and asset lockups. 
Properly utilized, deal protection devices can enhance the re-
turn for the target shareholders. Improperly used, they can (sub-
stantially) undercut target shareholders’ interests. Therefore, 
whether they enhance the target shareholders’ interests depends 
on the motives and the behavior of the target directors and manag-
ers who are agreeing to such mechanisms. This Article argues 
that when the incentives of target directors and managers are 
well aligned with those of the shareholders, not only can the deal 
protection devices increase the target shareholders’ welfare, the 
deal price can also be a more reliable indicator (compared to a 
case that does not have any deal protection measures) of fair 
value. At the opposite end, not only can deal protection devices 
substantially destroy target shareholders’ value, their presence 
can undercut the evidentiary value of the deal price as fair value. 
Finally, this Article argues that, even when the agents are 
properly discharging their duties, unreasonable deal protection 
measures can engender inefficiency and should be scrutinized un-
der contract law for possibly being against public policy. Particu-
larly when the target corporation has agreed to reimburse the 
buyer’s (out-of-pocket) expenses in case the deal falls apart, or 
when the target enjoys a strong bargaining position, a generous 
termination fee should trigger stronger scrutiny by courts for its 
potentially harmful public policy implications. 
